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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
HARRIS HARTZ*

I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Double jeopardy was an issue in more than a dozen cases before
the appellate courts last year. It appeared in three contexts: (1) after
declaration of a mistrial; (2) after a proceeding in which jeopardy had
not yet "attached"; and (3) in determining whether the defendant
could be sentenced for both of two separate offenses.
A. After Declarationof a Mistrial.
Although the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment'
generally prevents subjecting a defendant to two trials for the same
offense, it is well settled that a defendant can be retried if a conviction is reversed on appeal. 2 Similarly, the defendant ordinarily can
be subjected to a second trial after a mistrial is declared, either upon
the motion of the defendant or because "there is manifest necessity
for the [mistrial], or the ends of public justice would otherwise be
defeated." ' In State v. Day,4 State v. Dunn,' State v. Quintana,6 and
State v. Mestas," however, the courts considered whether a defendant
could be retried after a mistrial is declared because of prosecutorial
misconduct or error. This issue is now settled in New Mexico, In Day,
the supreme court held that retrial is permissible after a mistrial'
caused by prosecutorial misconduct unless "the prosecutor engaged
in any misconduct for the purpose of precipitating a motion for a
mistrial, gaining a better chance for conviction upon retrial, or sub*Associate, Pool, Tinnin & Martin, P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico.
1. U.S. Const. amend. V states: "[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
2. One exception is when the conviction is reversed because there was insufficient evidence to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1
(1978).
3. United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat 579, 580 (1824).
4. __N.M. -, 617 P.2d 142, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3248 (Oct. 7, 1980).
5. 93 N.M. 239, 599 P.2d 392 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 675, 593 P.2d 1078
(1979).
6. 93 N.M. 644, 603 P.2d 1101 (Ct. App. 1979).
7. 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (Ct. App. 1980).
8. Or, as in Day, after a reversal on appeal because of prosecutorial misconduct that
should have led to declaration of a mistrial.
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jecting the defendant to the harassment and inconvenience of successive trials." 9 Although the Day court stated that "[n] o clearly defined
rule on this issue before us has been announced and applied in this
state,"' 0 essentially the same rule had been stated in the three earlier
court of appeals cases. 1
This rule appears to be that expressed by the United States Supreme Court. 1 2 The rationale for the rule is straightforward. If the
prosecutor's conduct is designed to violate the intent of the double
jeopardy clause, then a retrial should be prohibited. A prosecutor
facing a likely acquittal should not be able to give the state a second
chance at a conviction by engaging in egregious conduct with the intent that the judge declare a mistrial. On the other hand, the double
jeopardy clause is not intended to prevent the prosecutor from doing
his utmost (even if he acts ill-advisedly and improperly) to ensure the
defendant's conviction. The court in Day stated that when the prosecutor's misconduct is sufficiently improper, although not motivated
by a desire to precipitate a mistrial, the appropriate remedy is a mistrial and disciplinary action against the prosecutor. In the court's view
the public should not suffer the consequences of the freeing
of a
1
guilty individual solely because of a prosecutor's misconduct. 3
The difficulty in applying the doctrine expressed in Day and its
precursors lies in determining the motivation of the prosecutor. One
factor to consider is the egregiousness of the prosecutor's error, for if
his conduct was so improper that he should have known that a mistrial would result, his motive was probably not to secure a conviction.
A second, and perhaps more telling, factor is the judge's own view of
whether the case was going badly for the prosecution. '
9.
-N.M. at __, 617 P.2d at 146.
10. Id.
11. An unclear pronouncement of this principle in Quintana was corrected in the Mestas
opinion.
12. Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 32-33 (1977); Divans v. California, 434 U.S. 1303
(1977) (opinion in chambers); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976).
13. This argument would have more force if prosecutorial incompetence were not the
cause of numerous criminals going free and if disciplinary action were a more realistic threat
under current New Mexico practice.
14. This consideration was noted specifically in Mestas where the trial court, in ruling
that an improper question was not asked in bad faith with the intention of provoking a mistrial, said: "She had everything to lose from that [question], nothing to gain. She had a very
favorable jury." 93 N.M. at 768, 605 P.2d at 1167. There is some authority to the effect
that retrial is barred whenever the prosecutor knowingly has engaged in misconduct. See
United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d
1246 (5th Cir. 1976). In practice there may be little difference between the two standards.
If the prosecutor "knows" his act is improper, he presumably knows it probably will provoke a mistrial.
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B. Attachment of Jeopardy.
Six cases involved the question of whether jeopardy had "attached." The concept of "attachment" of jeopardy is a convenient
tool for determining whether one has been subjected to double jeopardy. In a jury case, jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled
and sworn.' s In a non-jury proceeding, jeopardy attaches when the
judge is first presented with evidence at the trial.6 Proceedings before the attachment of jeopardy are irrelevant as far as the double
jeopardy clause is concerned. For example, if an indictment is dismissed on a pretrial motion, no jeopardy attaches, and the defendant
can be reindicted and tried for the same offense.
Two cases decided by the court of appeals show the range of matters which can be covered by the notion of attachment. In State v.
Romero,' ' there clearly was no double jeopardy problem. The defendant had been indicted twice for the same offense, but one of the
indictments was dismissed before he was tried on the second. Both
indictments were legally sufficient. The court ruled that jeopardy
had not attached before the one indictment was dismissed, so there
could have been no double jeopardy. The ruling is sound under double
jeopardy doctrine, but it is also supported by policy considerations.
A contrary result would make it difficult for a grand jury, after deliberating further or obtaining more evidence, to issue a superseding indictment clarifying, extending, or reducing the charges against one
already indicted.
In State v. Mares,' 8 the concept of attachment was taken to its
logical extreme in allowing a trial of the defendant even after the district judge had taken evidence and ruled that the defendant was "not
guilty." The unusual circumstance in Mares was that the "not guilty"
ruling had been rendered prior to trial. The defendant, a former sheriff's deputy, had been charged with aggravated battery. The defendant
moved that the charge be dismissed because the defendant at all times
had been "in the lawful discharge" of his duties as a peace officer
and "therefore, as a matter of law, the acts constituting the factual
basis for the indictment therein were lawful and the prosecution...
[could] not lie."' ' After holding an evidentiary hearing over the objections of the prosecutor, the court issued its "not guilty" ruling and
15.
16.
17.
18.
(1979).
19.

Christ v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978).
Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
94 N.M. 22, 606 P.2d 1116 (Ct. App. 1980).
92 N.M. 687, 594 P.2d 347 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 675, 593 P.2d 1078
Id. at 688, 594 P.2d at 348.
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dismissed the indictment. The court of appeals held that the trial
court had acted improperly in hearing the evidence before the trial as
well as in not allowing the jury to decide the issue. The defendant
argued that even if the trial court's ruling was improper, a verdict of
"not guilty" cannot be reviewed on appeal. Nevertheless, the court
of appeals held that jeopardy had not attached because the dismissal
occurred prior to trial.2" The district judge had no authority to make
a pre-trial determination regarding defendant's guilt or innocence.
Therefore, the matter should be treated like any other improper dismissal of an indictment-the indictment could be reinstated and the
defendant put on trial.
The court's lack of authority to rule was the basis of decision in
two other double jeopardy cases. In State v. Montoya,2 ' a delinquency petition containing four counts had been filed against the defendant in children's court. After a mistrial, three allegations were
dismissed with prejudice and the State filed a nolle prosequi with respect to the fourth. The defendant was then indicted in district court
on the first three charges. His motion to dismiss the indictment because it subjected him to double jeopardy was granted by the trial
court, but reversed on appeal. The defendant conceded that the children's court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the first three
offenses so that its actions with respect to them could not bar a later
prosecution. The court of appeals went one step further and ruled
that the children's court also lacked jurisdiction over the fourth
charge, involuntary manslaughter. The court of appeals held that the
vehicular homicide statute, rather than the involuntary manslaughter
statute, applied and that the children's court lacked jurisdiction to
proceed under the inapplicable statute. Because the children's court
had lacked jurisdiction over all four allegations, the children's court
proceeding could not bar the indictment regardless of whether the
offenses charged were the same. 2 2
The final case dealing with lack of authority, State v. James,2 I is
the most difficult. The defendant was charged in district court with
vehicular homicide. He claimed that the prosecution was barred because he had been prosecuted for lesser included offenses in municipal court. The supreme court provided two alternative grounds for
denying this claim. First, the defendant was not subjected to jeopardy
20. The court specifically relied on United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976) and
Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
21. 93 N.M. 346, 600 P.2d 292 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 532, 591 P.2d 286
(1979).
22. As an alternative holding, the court also ruled that none of the three offenses
charged in the indictment were the "same" as the involuntary manslaughter charge in children's court for double jeopardy purposes.
23. 93 N.M. 605, 603 P.2d 715 (1979).
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in the municipal court because he neither pled guilty nor was tried.
The dispute with respect to this ground was purely a factual one.
Second, the municipal court had no jurisdiction to try the charge of
vehicular homicide and, therefore, no proceeding in municipal court
could bar a district court prosecution for that offense.
To rule against the defendant, the supreme court had to distinguish
the United States Supreme Court decision in Waller v. Florida.24
Waller held that a state court and a municipal court are arms of the
same sovereignty, so the defendant may not be subjected to trial by
both for the same offense. 2 s But the James court held that a municipal court proceeding could not bar prosecution of a greater offense
over which the municipal court had no jurisdiction. The court found
no conflict with Waller, stating:
The Waller decision stands for the proposition that two courts within
a state-district and municipal-cannot each try a person for the same
crime. However, the Supreme Court recognized the possible existence
of exceptions to this rule .... [Waller, 397 U.S. at 395, n. 6.] In
Ashe v. Swenson, ... Mr. Justice Brennan specified and elaborated
upon several of these exceptions in his concurring opinion. He stated:
"Another exception would be necessary
if no single court had juris26
diction of all the alleged crimes."

But the only "exception" stated in the Waller footnote cited in James
was that the defendant could be prosecuted in state court for "offenses not embraced within the charges against him in the municipal
court", 2 '7 an exception which would also apply to successive prosecutions in the same court. The statement is hardly support for the
James result. Similarly,
Mr. Justice Brennan's footnote was quoted
2
out of context. 8
24. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
25. The ruling distinguished the state-municipality relationship from that between federal and state governments. A state may prosecute an individual for the same offense for
which he was prosecuted in federal court or vice versa because the two jurisdictions are considered separate sovereignties. The double jeopardy clause bars only repeated prosecution by
the same sovereignty. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121 (1959).
26. 93 N.M. at 607, 603 P.2d at 717.
27. 397 U.S. at 395, n. 6.
28. His footnote was stating an exception to his rule, not adopted by the Court, which
would require all offenses arising out of a single transaction to be prosecuted at one trial. In
other words, he would permit an exception to his rule to allow a municipal court to prosecute for driving without a license and a state court to prosecute for reckless driving even
when both charges arise from the same transaction. In addition, the James interpretation of
Mr. Justice Brennan's footnote is inconsistent with his categorical assertion in Robinson v.
Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 511 (1973), that the exception did not apply to a case when the defendant had been convicted of assault and battery in city court and assault with intent to commit murder in state court (almost certainly a matter beyond the municipal court's jurisdiction).
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More importantly, James is inconsistent with the rationale of
Waller that prosecutions by state and municipal authorities are prosecutions by the same sovereign. An offense and a lesser included offense are the same for double jeopardy purposes.2 " Thus, the James
exception would allow one sovereign to prosecute an individual twice
for the "same" offense if the municipal court charge was a lesser offense included in a greater offense (over which it had no jurisdiction)
charged in district court. If Waller itself left any doubt that this result
is prohibited, that doubt was removed in United States v. Wheeler,30

where the Court said: "[A] single sovereign [cannot] impose multiple punishment for a single offense merely by the expedient of establishing multiple political subdivisions with the power to punish
crimes."' 3 ' James should be reconsidered by the New Mexico Supreme

Court at the next opportunity. 2

Finally, in State v. Rogers3 ' and State v. Valenzuela,3 the courts
held that jeopardy does not attach in a post-conviction jury trial for
sentencing an habitual offender. 3 ' Although an individual cannot be
retried on a criminal charge if the conviction is reversed for the pros-

ecution's failure to present sufficient evidence to establish guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, 3 6 the courts in both Rogers and Valenzuela remanded for new habitual offender proceedings after holding

that the prior proceeding had not established that the defendant was
a habitual offender as charged. If the supreme court really means

that jeopardy does not attach at an habitual offender trial, presumably an "acquittal" in such a proceeding could be appealed by the
state. Both decisions followed State v. Linam, 37 and Rogers cited the
same case authority relied on in Linam.3 8 Those cases, however, ap29. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). The Court held that offenses arising from the
same act or transaction are the same unless "each ... requires proof of a fact which the
other does not." Id. at 166.
30. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
31. Id. at 321.
32. See Benard v. State, 481 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
33. 93 N.M. 519, 602 P.2d 616 (1979).
34. 94 N.M. 285, 609 P.2d 1241 (Ct. App. 1979), affd, 94 N.M. 340, 610 P.2d 744
(1980).
35. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-20(Supp. 1980).
36. Burksv. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
37. 93 N.M. 307, 600 P.2d 253, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 846 (1979).
38. Grugger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948); Davis v. Bennett, 400 F.2d 279 (8th Cit.
1968); and Pearsgn v. State, 521 S.W.2d 225 (Tenn. 1975). A decision post-dating these
cases, United States v. DiFrancesco, 101 S. Ct. 426 (1980), upholding the government's
right to appeal a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976), may appear to add support. But
much of the language in DiFrancesco suggests that a new trial for sentencing would be subject to the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 432-33, 437, 439. ("This limited appeal does not
involve a retrial ...

§ 3576 does not subject a defendant to a second trial ....

court... is empowered to correct only a legal error.")

The appellate
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pear to say only that a habitual offender prosecution does not subject
the defendant to multiple jeopardy for the prior offenses which are
the predicates of the habitual offender prosecution. What is needed is
an analysis of whether an habitual offender proceeding is one to which
the principles of double jeopardy apply. The United States Supreme
Court recently stated: "[T] he risk to which the term jeopardy refers
is that traditionally associated with 'actions intended to authorize
criminal punishment to vindicate public justice.' "I I By this standard, the criminal punishment imposed by an habitual offender proceeding would seem to be subject to the constraints of the double
jeopardy clause. It is significant that the burden of proof in such proceedings is to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 4 0 the burden applied only in criminal cases. The issue deserves more than the
brief paragraph provided in the opinions thus far.
C. Multiple Sentencing.
One recurring issue in double jeopardy litigation is whether two
offenses are sufficiently related that punishment for both, even after
a consolidated trial, is prohibited. In State v. Manus,4 1 the defendant
claimed that double jeopardy prohibited his receiving consecutive
sentences for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and
aggravated assault. Manus argued that because all three charges arose
out of the same episode, the "same transaction" test prohibited consecutive sentences. The supreme court, however, followed its earlier
decision in State v. Tanton 4 2 and applied the "same evidence" test,
ruling that the three convictions required proof of different elements
and that different evidence was admitted to prove those elements.
Because the charges related to three different victims, the result in
Manus clearly seems correct under double jeopardy principles.
The related doctrine of merger, however, may have provided a
slightly better prospect for relief. The court may order "merger" of
two offenses when the offenses are not identical for double jeopardy
purposes if public policy or legislative intent precludes multiple punishment. 4 3 Thus, Manus could have contended on policy grounds
39. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 (1975).
40. State v. Dawson, 91 N.M. 70, 72, 570 P.2d 608, 610 (Ct. App. 1977); N.M. U.J.1.
Crim. 39.01.
41. 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280(1979).
42. 88 N.M. 333, 540 P.2d 813 (1975).
43. Compare State v. Boeglin, 90 N.M. 93, 559 P.2d 1220 (Ct. App. 1977) (only one
larceny, although six pistols taken) and State v. Cuevas, 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 960 (October
16, 1980) (only one conviction for contributing to delinquency of three minors at same
party) with State v. Smith, 94 N.M. 379, 610 P.2d 1208 (1980) (four consecutive sentences
allowed for trafficking in four different drugs at the same time).
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that he should be subjected to punishment on only the first degree
murder charge, with the other offenses being merged into it. But
there is little to recommend this argument under the facts of the case.
In a later case, however, the court's treatment of both double
jeopardy and merger was less satisfactory. In State v. Stephens,4 4 the
court upheld the imposition of consecutive sentences for felony murder and the underlying felony (armed robbery). Referring to both
double jeopardy and the merger doctrine, the court found that
neither offense "necessarily involves" the other and the two offenses
are not the "same offense" under the "same evidence" test because
either crime could be committed without committing the other. This
conclusion was reached, "even though it [was] necessary to prove
the underlying4 felony in order to convict the defendant of first degree murder." 1
The court's analysis fails on two counts. First, if the two crimes
are not the "same offense," the defendant could be tried successively
for felony murder and the underlying felony. The United States Supreme Court, however, has unanimously ruled in identical circumstances (armed robbery and felony murder) that successive prosecutions are a violation of the double jeopardy clause.1 6
Second, even if the Constitution in itself does not bar consecutive
sentences, the United States Supreme Court in Whalen v. United
States, 4 7 in overturning consecutive sentences for felony murder and
the underlying felony, said "[ti he Double Jeopardy Clause at the
very least precludes federal courts from imposing consecutive sentences unless authorized by Congress to do so."' 8 Thus, the Stephens
court should have determined whether there is legislative authority
for multiple sentences in the felony murder context. New Mexico
law is 'not controlled by the decision in Whalen that the District of
Columbia statutes do not permit consecutive sentences for felony
murder and the underlying felony. Whalen suggests, however, that
more analysis is needed of this issue, rather than the formalistic argument of Stephens and its unamplified conclusion that "[c] onsecutive
sentences are proper in a case such as the one at bar."4 9 A future
case may provide an opportunity for discussion of public policy issues
44. 93 N.M. 458, 601 P.2d 428 (1979).
45. Id. at 463, 601 P.2d at 433.
46. Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977).
47. 100 S. Ct. 1432 (1980). The Court did not decide whether the double jeopardy
clause permits consecutive sentences for two offenses which must be tried together. Four
justices, however, joined in opinions stating that so long as Congress authorized consecutive
sentences, the double jeopardy clause would not be violated.
48. Id. at 1436.
49. 93 N.M. at 463, 601 P.2d at 433.
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and the rule adopted in Whalen that "doubt must be resolved in favor
of lenity."" 0
Finally, in State v. Leyba,5 ' the court considered a statute restricting multiple sentencing. The defendant had been indicted for shoplifting and conspiracy. The shoplifting statute specifically prohibits
charging a defendant "with a separate or additional offense arising
out of the same transaction"' 2 upon which the shoplifting charge is
based. The district court accordingly dismissed the conspiracy charge,
but the court of appeals reversed. The court pointed out that conspiracy is a crime of agreement, which requires no overt act, and
"It] he overt act which constitutes the object of the conspiracy is no
part of the crime of conspiracy." ' I This statement would be appropriate in double jeopardy analysis. The issue in Leyba, however, was
the meaning of the statute, not the requirements of the constitution.
To conclude, as the court of appeals did, that "[tI he alleged conspiracy did not arise from the same transaction as led to the charge of
shoplifting,"' ' is to suggest that the legislature intended to enact a
very technical statutory provision that virtually dupliated the double
jeopardy clauses of the state and federal constitutions. In this regard
it is noteworthy that the only authority cited by Leyba for the meaning of "same transaction" was a double jeopardy decision.
II. HARMLESS ERROR
The doctrine of harmless error provides that a conviction will not
be overturned despite error in the criminal proceeding if the defendant would have been convicted notwithstanding the error. An equivalent doctrine applies in civil proceedings, but because the burden on
the prosecution in a criminal case is to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it is much more difficult to contend that an error would
not have changed the result in a criminal trial.
This is not to say that the doctrine has no role. For example, it
50. 100 S. Ct. at 1439. The New Mexico Supreme Court had that opportunity in State
v. Martinez, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 238 (Feb. 26, 1981), when it considered Whalen in the context of consecutive sentences for armed robbery and felony murder. But it misread Whalen
as saying that merger was required because, unlike the situation in Martinez, "the two offenses in the case required proof of the same facts." 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 241. On the contrary, merger was required in Whalen because proof of the underlying felony was "a necessary
element of proof of the felony murder." 100 S. Ct. at 1439. This was exactly the situation
in Martinez. Moreover, the Martinez court never reached the difficult double jeopardy issue
raised by Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977), which the Whalen court avoided by
finding merger.
51. 93 N.M. 366, 600 P.2d 312 (Ct. App. 1979).
52. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-20 (1978).

53. 93 N.M. at 367, 600 P.2d at 313.
54. Id.
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would be difficult to criticize its application in State v. Manus.' -1 In
that case the supreme court found that shotgun shells seized in a
murder investigation were the product of an unlawful search. Because
the issue at trial was the defendant's intent, not who had fired the
shotgun, one would be hard put to say that introduction of the shotgun shells as evidence influenced the verdict.
A. Jury Instructionsand Communications with the Jury.
The New Mexico courts have been reluctant to find that improper
jury instructions and improper communications with the jury constitute harmless error. The courts generally have presumed prejudice in
these cases, particularly when instructions have failed to conform 5to6
the uniform jury instructions for criminal cases. In State v. Sanders,
the prosecution introduced evidence of two incidents of alleged child
abuse that occurred prior to the abuse incident which formed the
basis of the charge. The only purpose for which the evidence was admissible was to establish that the incident in question was not an
accident. Despite defendant's request, the trial court did not give a
requested Uniform Jury Instruction (U.J.I.),'7 limiting the jury's
consideration of the prior incidents to "absence of accident." Holding that "upon a showing of the slightest evidence of prejudice, the
error [will] be reversible error"' 8 when a U.J.I. instruction is not
given, and pointing out that the defendant's credibility was a crucial
issue in the case, the court of appeals found a sufficient showing of
prejudice to reverse. Yet one should be skeptical that such limiting
instructions have any real effect on the jury.
In State v. Griffin," 9 the issue was whether Griffin, who was being
tried as an habitual offender, was the same person as a Kenneth
Smitherman, who had been convicted of felonies in another state.
The court's instructions on the elements of the charge referred to the
defendant as "Kenneth Griffin a/k/a Kenneth Smitherman." The
court of appeals reversed because the instruction "had the effect of
preempting the jury's function of determining the issue of identity," 6 0 although again one wonders whether the language of the incould have influenced the jury in its determination of idenstruction
6
tity. 1
55. 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280 (1979).
56. 93 N.M. 450, 601 P.2d 83 (Ct. App. 1979).
57. N.M.U.J.I. Crim. 40.28.
58. 93 N.M. at 451, 601 P.2d at 84.
59. 94 N.M. 5, 606 P.2d 543 (Ct. App. 1980).
60. Id. at -. , 606 P.2d at 544. The result in this case has been greatly limited by State
v. Muniz, 20 N.M. St. B. BulL 2231 (Jan. 29, 1981).
61. In State v. Poore, 19 N.M. St. B. BulL 529 (Ct. App. July 19, 1979), the court of
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The New Mexico courts also have looked with a jaundiced eye at
any communication of the judge with the jury that is not made in
open court and in the presence of the defendant and his counsel. Last
year saw two reversals on this ground. In State v. McCarter,6 2 the
trial court sent what the supreme court considered to be a "shotgun"
instruction 6 3 in a note to the jury after a proceeding at which de64
fense counsel, but not defendant, was present. In State v. Stephens,
the judge in a murder case sent a note to the jury answering its question about the stage of the moon on the date of the alleged offense,
despite defense counsel's compelling objection that the jury also
would need other information about conditions of visibility. The
substance of the communications in both cases undoubtedly involved
substantial and influential error, but the language of the two opinions
emphasized the prosecutor's heavy burden of establishing harmless
error when the proceduralrequirement is not met.
It is highly improper for the trial court to have any communication
with the jury except in open court and in the presence of the accused
and his counsel. When such communication takes place, a presumption of prejudice arises .... The State has the burden of affirmatively
showing that the defendant was not prejudiced by the communication between the court and the jury.
Further, the record fails to show substantial evidence to the effect
that the communication did not affect the verdict. The burden of
establishing this fact resting with the state, and the state failing to
meet this burden, the presumption of prejudicial error must prevail.6 This particularly strict standard for reviewing incorrect instructions
or improper communications with the jury can be justified because
there is little excuse for that type of error. Reversal may be appropriate as a matter of superintending control over the lower
courts
6
even in the absence of significant prejudice to the accused. 6
appeals held that failure to give a uniform jury instruction was harmless error since the substance of the omitted instruction was covered by other instructions. But this result was reversed by the supreme court. State v. Poore, 94 N.M. 172, 608 P.2d 148 (1980).
62. 93 N.M. 708, 604 P.2d 1242 (1980).
63. A shotgun instruction is one that puts excessive pressure on a dissenting juror to join
with the majority in its verdict. Id. at 710-11, 604 P.2d at 1244-45.
64. 93 N.M. 458, 601 P.2d 428 (1979).
65. State v. Stephens, 93 N.M. at 460-61, 601 P.2d at 430-31, quoted in State v. McCarter, 93 N.M. at 711, 604 P.2d at 1245.
66. In State v. Saavedra, 93 N.M. 242, 599 P.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1979), where the judge
communicated with the jury by handwritten note, but the conviction was not reversed because the note correctly stated the law and the defendant had waived any objection to the
procedure used.
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B. "Bad Character"Evidence.
Predicting the effects of evidence on a jury is a task beset with uncertainty.6 7 One type of inadmissible evidence that is unlikely to be
"harmless," however, is that which could lead the jury to conclude
that the defendant is probably guilty or that his case is unworthy of
consideration because he is a "bad person." Several appellate decisions last year dealt with this type of evidence.6 8
Casaus v. State69 reversed the court of appeals' decision and held
that it was not harmless error to admit into evidence a prior conviction of the defendant. Although a recent prior conviction may be
used to impeach the defendant's credibility if he testifies, the conviction used in Casaus was too remote in time to be admissible for that
purpose.70 Given the probable impact on the jury of evidence of the
defendant's prior conviction, the supreme court held that, when such
evidence is admitted improperly, the error is prejudicial except in
special circumstances. 1
The court of appeals found that the admission of "bad character"
72
evidence was not harmless error in two cases. In State v. Gonzales,
evidence was admitted that the defendant's brother and another person assaulted a principal prosecution witness, but no evidence was
produced directly tying the defendant to the beating. 7 ' The conviction was reversed. In State v. Bartlett,74 a murder trial, the court of
appeals found reversible error where the prosecutor repeatedly referred in his questioning of defendant to a prior arrest "for trying to
kill your father with a knife," 7 when the prosecution's evidence
showed that there was no arrest for that offense. The court of appeals
ruled that the trial judge's attempt to cure the error with an instruction to the jury could not be effective under the circumstances.
67. A Jury Research Project Study now being conducted at the University of New Mexico by Dr. Gale Sutton-Barbere, Ph.D. is apparently the first systematic research concerning
the impact upon juries of improperly admitted evidence.
68. State v. Sanders, 93 N.M. 450, 601 P.2d 83 (Ct. App. 1979), discussed at notes 5658 supra, also involved evidence that could be misused by the jury as evidence of bad character.
69. 94 N.M. 58, 607 P.2d 596 (1980).
70. N.M.R. Evid. 609(a)(1). Basically, the rule restricts admissibility to those prior convictions from the preceding ten years.
71. The court also reversed the court of appeals' ruling that the improper admission into
evidence of a gun taken from the defendant when he was arrested was harmless error. 94
N.M. at 59, 607 P.2d at 597.
72. 93 N.M. 445, 601 P.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1979).
73. If the state had proved that the defendant had been responsible for the beating, the
evidence could have been offered to show an attempt to suppress evidence or testimony,
which is admissible to prove consciousness of guilt.
74. 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 231 (Ct. App. March 13, 1980).
75. Id. at 232.
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In four cases, however, the court of appeals found the admission
7 6
of "bad character" evidence to be harmless error. In State v. Castro,
the defendant was convicted of manslaughter of his former wife. The
court ruled that, although admission of testimony that the defendant
had been dismissed from employment for harassing three women was
improper, it was harmless error in light of the defendant's seventeen
page sworn confession. Perhaps the confession covered every item
that could possibly have prejudiced the jury against the defendant,
but any type of "bad character" testimony is bound to have some
effect on a jury, particularly when the issue at trial is the defendant's
intent.
In State v. Mills,7 the court of appeals agreed that in the prosecution of the defendant for aggravated battery it was improper to have
introduced evidence that the defendant's wife lived at a drug rehabilitation center "because of some unidentified 'problems.' "78 The
court, however, dismissed defendant's arguments that this evidence
would reflect prejudicially on the defendant. The conclusion is debatable since one could expect some jurors to think that a person whose
wife is associated with the drug culture is less deserving of concern
and is more likely to commit an offense than others are. 7 9
A more questionable case is State v. Gutierrez.8 The evidence
against the defendant consisted of a robbery victim's eye witness
identification, corroborated by his selection of defendant's photograph from police mug books. The prosecutor's repeated references
to "mug books" focused the jury's attention on the defendant's prior
involvement with the police, and could have had a decided effect on
the jury, particularly since the state needed to rely exclusively on the
veracity of one individual. Although the court invoked the rule that
it could find harmless error only when "evidence of defendant's guilt
[is] so overwhelmingly persuasive that under no reasonable probability could the exhibits have induced the jury's finding of guilt," 8 1 it
found the error to be harmless. At least the court said it would reverse
if the error were repeated in the future.
The most disturbing of the opinions in this area is State v. Vialpando,8 2 although the result is defensible. A witness, in response to
76. 92 N.M. 585, 592 P.2d 185 (Ct. App. 1979).
77. 94 N.M. 17, 606 P.2d 1111 (Ct. App. 1980).
78. Id. at - , 606 P.2dat 1115.
79. Also in Mills the court found harmless error in some jurors having seen the defendant in handcuffs under escort. This result was correct because the jury already was informed through admissible evidence that the defendant was currently in prison.
80. 93 N.M. 232, 599 P.2d 385 (Ct. App. 1979).
81. Id. at 235, 599 P.2d at 388.
82. 93 N.M. 289, 599 P.2d 1086 (Ct. App. 1979).
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questioning from the judge, unexpectedly volunteered information
that he had first met the defendant at the state penitentiary. The
trial court offered to instruct the jury that the defendant had not
been an inmate at the time, but the defendant refused the instruction.
Given the circumstances of the case, such an instruction may have
effectively eliminated the prejudicial impact of the witness' statement. The defendant's decision to oppose the instruction should not
aid him in obtaining a reversal of his conviction. The court's language
in attempting to buttress its conclusion with a harmless error argument, however, was unfortunate. The court, citing Gutierrez,' 3
wrote,
[R] eceipt of inadmissible evidence is not reversible error when other
evidence of defendant's guilt is so persuasive that under no reasonable probability could the improper evidence have induced the jury's
verdict. The converse of that principle is the necessity of finding that
there was no reasonable probability of a guilty verdict without the
inadmissible evidence.84

The second sentence, if it means what it appears to say, not only is
incorrect as a matter of logic,' s but also is contrary to the principles
of the harmless error doctrine. The sentence seems to say that the
erroneous admission of evidence will cause reversal of a conviction
only if it would have been unreasonable to convict without the evidence. In other words, to establish reversible error, it is necessary to
show that a directed verdict of acquittal would be required if the inadmissible evidence were not considered.8 6 The best that can be said
83. State v. Gutierrez, 93 N.M. 232, 599 P.2d 385 (Ct. App. 1979).
84. 93 N.M. at 297, 599 P.2d at 1094 (emphasis added).
85. The converse would be: "Error in the admission of evidence is reversible if there was
a reasonable probability of a not guilty verdict without the inadmissible evidence."
86. One would also hope that the language in the sentence was merely an oversight. But
similar disturbing language appears with respect to a second issue in the case, which concerned the amendment of the indictment. Before the jury was instructed, the state was permitted to change its allegation from (1) causing the victim to engage in sexual intercourse by
use of force and coercion and in the commission of other felonies to (2) causing the victim
to engage in sexual intercourse by use of force and coercion or by the commission of other
felonies. The amendment, in the absence of any showing of prejudice to the defendant in
the preparation of his case, would seem proper. But the court went one step further than
necessary by contending that the defendant would have been convicted under the original
indictment in any case. "[W] hether the indictment was amended or not, defendant suffered
no detriment," wrote the court, since "there is no substantial evidence whatever that all of
the crimes charged, and all of the elements of each crime, were not proved." 93 N.M. at
299, 599 P.2d at 1096. The court appears to be saying: "We think all of the elements of the
crime were proved, so what does it matter if the jury was not instructed properly on those
elements." This statement is contrary to the law in New Mexico in that failure to instruct
properly on the elements of an offense is reversible error even if the defendant failed to object to the instructions. State v. Rhea, 93 N.M. 478, 601 P.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1979); State v.
Walsh, 81 N.M. 65, 463 P.2d 41 (Ct. App. 1969).
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for the language of Vialpando is that it is ill-considered dictum. It reflects a rather offhand approach to harmless error and a general tendency of the court of appeals to apply the doctrine both when it is
unnecessary (because affirmance is proper on other grounds) and in
inappropriate circumstances. A doctrine that upholds criminal convictions, despite error at trial, should not be a favorite of the law and
must be applied with the greatest circumspection. Refusal to find
harmless error will rarely set the guilty free; it requires only a new
trial.
C. "Bruton" Error.
In State v. Richter,8 7 the error was a violation of the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in Bruton v. United States.8 8 Bruton held
that a non-testifying co-defendant's confession implicating the defendant is not admissible at a joint trial of the two defendants, even
when the trial court instructs the jury that the confession is admissible against only the co-defendant. 89 Richter, however, held that the
error was harmless because the defendant's own confession, which established all the elements of the offense, was also admitted at the
trial. It is appealing to view virtually any error as harmless when the
defendant confesses, and the result in Richter is supported by several
decisions cited in the opinion. 9 0 In addition, several weeks after the
Richter decision the United States Supreme Court affirmed a conviction under similar circumstances in Parkerv. Randolph. 9 1 But as Mr.
Justice Blackmun's concurrence in that case convincingly argues,
whether there is harmless error will depend on more than just whether
the defendant confessed. 92 The confessions must be examined closely
to see where they do and do not overlap and what effect the differences may have on the defense raised by the accused. Richter may be
a sound result, but the opinion omits the underlying analysis essential for a proper determination of the issue.
87. 93 N.M. 55, 596 P.2d 268 (Ct. App. 1979).
88. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
89. Bruton held that a jury, despite the limiting instruction, could not be expected to
ignore the co-defendant's accusation against the defendant, and the use of such hearsay
would, therefore, violate the sixth amendment right of the defendant to confront his accusers. Id. at 126.
90. Metropolis v. Turner, 437 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Mancusi, 404
F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1968).
91. 442 U.S. 62 (1979). Of the eight Justices participating in Parker v. Randolph, four
found that under the circumstances of the case-including a confession by the defendant
himself-a limiting instruction to the jury sufficed and there was no error. (The Richter
opinion does not indicate whether the jury was instructed to consider the confession only
on the issue of the confessing co-defendant's guilt.) Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred on the
ground that the error was harmless, and three dissenters thought the error was not harmless.
92. Id. at 79-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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III. DECISIONS INVOLVING THE GRAND JURY
The grand jury, and the way it conducts its business, is a matter of
growing public concern. In New Mexico issues relating to the grand
jury are appearing more frequently before the courts. The results,
however, are not wholly satisfactory. The rationale underlying the
decision is not explored in the opinions, thereby making prediction
of future results uncertain.
A. Evidence Before the GrandJury.
The chief recurring issue recently has been the propriety of the
evidence presented or not presented to the grand jury. There were six
appellate decisions in this area during the year. In Maldonado v.
State,9 3 the sole supreme court case, the defendant sought reversal
of his conviction on the ground that inadmissible evidence had been
presented to the grand jury which returned an indictment against
him. The court followed its fifty-six year old precedent, State v.
Chance,9 4 and affirmed the conviction on the ground that the courts
would not review such a claim.
In both cases the defendants, Chance and Maldonado, relied on
the New Mexico statute 9 5 which states: "All evidence [before the
grand jury] must be such as would be legally admissible upon trial." 96
The Chance court held that the statute was merely "directory" and
"for the guidance of the grand jury."'9 It was persuaded by the traditional secrecy of grand jury proceedings and the doctrine that a
court cannot review the grand jury's actions with respect to the evidence presented to that body without "clear statutory authority." It
feared that a contrary result would permit every person indicted to
compel a hearing at which he or she could ascertain what had been
presented to the grand jury, "thus injecting into our judicial system a
new and highly objectionable procedure." 9'
The Maldonado court noted that the legislature had never taken
the opportunity to amend the statute to make its terms mandatory
rather than directory, 9 9 thereby implying a legislative intent that the
courts are not to enforce the statute. Regardless of the soundness of
the Chance decision, it had received the imprimatur of legislative
silence.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

93 N.M. 670, 604 P.2d 363 (1979).
29 N.M. 34, 221 P. 183 (1923).
Now N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-11(A) (Supp. 1980).
Maldonado also raised a due process argument, discussed below.
29 N.M. at 39, 221 P. at 185.
Id.
93 N.M. at 671, 604 P.2d at 364.
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The court in Maldonado, however, went beyond mere statutory interpretation. It also embraced the Chance result on policy grounds.
These grounds apparently were intended not only to buttress the
court's ruling with respect to the statute, but also to justify the second holding of the court: that due process did not require it to review
the prosecutor's presentation of inadmissible evidence to the grand
jury. These policies were expressed as follows: "We merely recognize,
as do the majority of jurisdictions, that there are compelling reasons
for the courts not to go behind an indictment to inquire into the evidence considered by a grand jury. These reasons include the need for
both judicial economy and the secrecy of grand jury proceedings."' 0
Unfortunately, these two reasons' 0 ' were not explored in greater
depth. The need for secrecy of grand jury proceedings is hardly the
concern that it was twenty years ago.' 02 In New Mexico the defendant ordinarily is entitled to receive from the state, within ten days
after arraignment, a list of the witnesses the state intends to call at
trial and all of their prior statements, including grand jury testimony.' 0 3 In some cases defendants obtain complete grand jury transcripts. In Maldonado the defendant was able to cite the specific instances of the presentation of allegedly inadmissible evidence to the
grand jury; so apparently nothing secret was presented to the Maldonado court. Moreover, the reasons for secrecy previously expressed
by the New Mexico Supreme Court' 0 4 ordinarily would not apply
100. Id.
101. One policy ground supporting Chance was ignored by the court: the statute is unwise if interpreted literally. Hearsay that would be inadmissible at trial is perfectly appropriate before a grand jury in a variety of circumstances. For example, in ordinary cases it is
justifiable to avoid the expense of calling tangential supporting witnesses or experts such as
a chemist identifying a dangerous drug. In investigatory grand jury work, hearsay is not only
appropriate, it is often necessary or virtually unavoidable; hearsay can be an essential source
of leads. Moreoever, whether the hearsay would be admissible at trial may often be indeterminable when it is offered to the grand jury because admissibility may depend on unforeseeable events such as whether the declarant becomes a defendant.
102. In Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966), the United States Supreme Court
first held that the prior grand jury testimony of a witness at trial should have been disclosed
to the defendant for inspection in preparation for cross examination of the witness. Since
1970 such discovery has been allowed with respect- to every government witness in federal
court. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(3) (1976).
103. N.M.R. Crim. P. 27(a)(5).
104. The reasons for [keeping grand jury sessions secret includel ...promoting
freedom in the disclosure of crime; preventing coercion of grand jurors through
outside influences and intimidation, thus allowing a freedom of deliberation
and expressions of opinion which would otherwise be impossible; prohibiting
[sic] the safety and anonihnity [sic] of witnesses, thus encouraging the greatest possible latitude in their voluntary testimony; preventing forewarning to
those whose criminal conduct has been uncovered; and protecting the good
names of persons considered by the grand jury but not indicted.
Baird v. State, 90 N.M. 667, 669, 568 P.2d 193, 195 (1977).
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when disclosure comes after the indictment and apprehension of the
defendant.
"Judicial economy" may be a more compelling policy reason, but
it is not defined in the opinion. On its face it would seem to refer to
conservation of judicial resources, the avoidance of duplicative effort,
as when the same issue is presented repeatedly to the court. 1 05 In
Maldonado, however, the challenge to the grand jury proceeding was
raised after conviction, so that "judicial economy" in this case would
mean a total elimination of any judicial review of the issue.
"Judicial economy" may refer, however, to the notion that it is
wasteful and dilatory for the courts to review the propriety of evidence presented to the grand jury because the trial jury will weigh
only the admissible evidence. This rationale was expressed by the
Hawaii Supreme Court in State v. Bell:' 06
[T] he grand jury phase is devoted only to a preliminary determination of whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against
any person. The full trial phase-with its attendant evidentiary and
procedural restrictions- still remains the actual adjudicatory stage of
the guilt or innocence of the accused ....
[T] he greatest safeguard
to the liberty of the accused is the petit jury and the rules governing
its determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence." . . . The ex
parte nature of the grand jury is based upon "an abiding confidence
in the jury trial system ... ."1 7

Regardless of the rationale behind Maldonado, there is substantial
United States Supreme Court authority supporting the proposition
that defects in the presentation of evidence to the grand jury do not
raise issues of due process. In Frisbie v. Collins, the Court wrote that
"due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted
of crime after having been fairly apprised of the charges against him
105. This could be a description of one of the policy arguments of the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), which held that motions
to suppress unlawfully seized evidence will not be heard at the grand jury stage of a proceeding. The Court said that suppressing evidence at the grand jury stage, rather than awaiting
indictment, would retard investigations without advancing the purpose of the exclusionary
rule-the deterrence of unlawful searches.
106. 60 Hawaii 241, 589 P.2d 517 (1978) (failure to present exculpatory evidence to
grand jury does not violate due process unless evidence is "clearly exculpatory").
107. Id. at
, 89 P.2d at 520-21. This policy reason is also suggested in Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956), which held that a review of the evidence presented to
the grand jury to determine if it was insufficient or improper (a) is not required by the fifth
amendment provision that all felonies be prosecuted only after a grand jury indictment and
(b) would not be instituted by the Court under its supervisory powers. The Court wrote that
the result of a rule requiring such review: "would be that before trial on the merits a defendant could always insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine the competency and
adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury." Id. at 363. Further, the rule "would result
in interminable delay but add nothing to the assurance of a fair trial." Id. at 364.
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and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural
safeguards." 1 0 8 Also, in Costello v. United States, the Court held that
"an indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand
jury, like an information drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on its face,
is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits."' 09 Although
it might be argued that a grand jury becomes biased if it is not presented with exculpatory evidence or if it is presented with inadmissible evidence, the bias referred to in Costello is apparently bias, such
as racial prejudice, which exists at the outset of the investigation.' 1 0
Thus, the only occasion on which the presentation of evidence to
the grand jury might raise a due process issue is when that presentation somehow infects the trial itself. In Maldonado the court rejected
the defendant's claim that due process was violated by the prosecutor's presentation of inadmissible evidence to the grand jury because,
in the court's view, Maldonado was not denied a fair trial.
To summarize the result in Maldonado:
1) The statute requiring that the grand jury receive only evidence admissible at trial is "directory" only and does not require
(or permit) judicial supervision;
2) Due process is not violated by the use of improper evidence
before the grand jury unless the trial itself is rendered unfair.
The bottom line of the holding is that neither the statute nor due
process requires that a trial be delayed or a conviction after a fair
trial be overturned because of questions raised about the evidence
presented to the grand jury.
Maldonado does not hold, however, that no remedies are available
for abuse of the grand jury. Maldonado states that the statutory
directives are to be obeyed. At least four possible checks on grand
jury abuse could be imposed. First, an indictment may require a trial
without justifying custody. The United States Supreme Court has
held that any information filed by the government is enough to initi108. 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (the defendant unsuccessfully claimed that he was
denied due process because he was unlawfully abducted from one state to bring him to trial
in another).
109. 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) (footnote omitted) (indictment based entirely on hearsay will not be quashed). This proposition was recently affirmed in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 118-19 (1975), which held that a conviction will not be overturned on the ground
that the information filed in the case was not founded on probable cause. Although the defendant's arguments in Costello and Gerstein were not explicitly predicated on due process,
it would be remarkable if the results were rejected on that ground. Beck v. Washington, 369
U.S. 541, 546 (1962), suggested that due process required no more than Costello.
110. The case cited by the Court on the "unbiased" requirement was Pierre v. Louisiana,
306 U.S. 354 (1939), in which an indictment was overturned because blacks were excluded
from the grand jury. This case and similar cases decided recently rest on equal protection
grounds. E.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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ate a trial, but that the defendant cannot be held in custody without
a judicial determination of probable cause to support the information. 1'' Similarly, if significant prosecutorial abuse occurs in presenting evidence to a grand jury, the fourth amendment or due
process may require that a defendant be freed pending trial.
Second, one who has suffered the stigma and expense arising from
an indictment procured through prosecutorial abuse of the grand jury
could bring a civil action against the prosecutor involved. The fact
that civil suits have proved ineffective in deterring or remedying unlawful searches may be largely the result of victims' being perceived
as criminals, especially where the search uncovered contraband or
other evidence of crime. When an indictment is obtained by government misconduct, however, the victim is likely to be acquitted in the
criminal trial and would make a more attractive civil plaintiff than
would a victim of the unlawful search.' 12
Bar disciplinary action, despite its present deficiencies in New
Mexico, is a third remedy which must be considered. Even a warning
could have an important educational effect.
Finally, and most important of all, the courts can exercise their inherent powers to oversee grand jury proceedings to curb abuses.' 1 3
In determining whether to quash an indictment or apply other sanctions the court, under this overseeing power can weigh such factors
as:
1. Repetition of a violation criticized in the past;' '4
2. Delay of the trial;
3. Egregiousness of the violation; and
4. Violation of grand jury secrecy.
IIt. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 109 n.10(1975).
112. The New Mexico Tort Claims Act would appear to allow for this cause of action.
See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-4(B) (1978). But the common law has provided immunity to
prosecutors. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 429 (1976); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 656 (1977).
113. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hufstedler, J., concurring) (appropriate
ground for dismissing indictment because of knowing use of perjured testimony is exercise
of supervisory power, not due process); United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir.
1972) (after repeated admonitions in earlier decisions against excessive use of hearsay before
grand jury, court reverses conviction for such excessive use); United States v. Mackey, 405
F. Supp. 854 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 101,
at 151 (1969).
"Supervisory powers" may be a better descriptive term than "overseeing power," but it
is important to distinguish between this power over grand juries and the New Mexico Supreme Court's constitutionally derived power of "superintending control over all inferior
courts.- This constitutional provision by its terms would not apply to supervisory control
over grand juries. N.M. Const. art. 6, § 3; State v. Gunzelman, 85 N.M. 295, 299, 512 P.2d
55, 59(1973).
114. See United States v. Estepa, 471 F. 2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972).
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This power also could be applied to provide perhaps the most effective means of preventing abuse, requiring the state's prosecutors to
take a relatively brief ethics course shortly after beginning duty.
The exercise of this inherent overseeing power was not an issue in
Maldonado, and in any case the facts did not justify its application.
The allegedly inadmissible evidence involved was not crucial to the
case and no egregious conduct by the prosecutor was apparent. A
consideration of this inherent power, though, provides a useful framework in which to analyze the year's court of appeals decisions involving questions of the propriety of evidence before the grand jury.
Since none of the cases involved an allegation of denial of a fair trial,
under Maldonado an exercise of the court's inherent power to oversee grand jury proceedings would be the only appropriate basis for
review.
Of the five court of appeals cases, none posed problems of grand
jury secrecy and two involved only simple factual inquiry unlikely to
lead to complex litigation. In these two cases, therefore, exercise of
the court's inherent power would be justified by any substantial claim
of abuse.
In the first case, State v. Poore,' s the defendant challenged the
grand jury indictment on the basis that an essential witness before
the grand jury had not been sworn. The trial court heard testimony
from both the witness and the grand jury foreman that the witness
was sworn and ruled that the indictment was proper. The court of
appeals affirmed. Without referring to Chance' 1 6 (although unsworn
testimony would be "inadmissible evidence"), the court held that the
trial court's inquiry did not violate the rule imposing grand jury secrecy. It did not state, however, what the remedy, if any, would be if
unsworn testimony had been taken, and it did not consider whether
the trial court's inquiry was appropriate. Considered in the framework of the application of the court's power of oversight, the issues
are straightforward. As noted in Poore, no rationale for secrecy would
require the court to refrain from hearing whether a witness was sworn
or to prohibit either the witness or the foreman from testifying on
this issue. Also, a proceeding on such a simple issue is unlikely to
cause substantial delay.' ' There being no strong reason against
ruling on this issue, the exercise of this power is appropriate even if
the use of unsworn testimony were not an egregious error.
115. 18 N.M. St. B. Bull. 530 (Ct. App.), rev'don othergrounds, 94 N.M. 172, 608 P.2d
148 (1980).
116. 29 N.M. 34, 221 P. 183 (1923).
117. A hearing by the trial court would be brief, and because the likelihood of any reversal of the trial court's finding is slim, the long delays that might result from a reversal on
appeal would not occur.
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A similar analysis applies to State v. Stevens.' '8 The indictment
against Stevens was quashed by the district court because the prosecutor presented testimony concerning a statement made by Stevens
even though the trial court had earlier suppressed the statement in
another proceeding against him. The court of appeals held that the
district court had no right to review the admissibility of the evidence
in the second grand jury proceeding. The decision is consistent with
the language in Chance and its progeny, on which the court of appeals
relied.' 1 9 But if Stevens had raised the possibility of the exercise of
overseeing power, a contrary result would- have been appropriate.
Clearly, no secrecy issue is involved in this second use of the defendant's confession. Nor can any sound argument based on judicial
economy be made. A determination of whether the evidence before
the grand jury is admissible would require no lengthy delay, since the
issue of admissibility would have been resolved in the prior proceeding. ' 20 Thus, if the court in Stevens had decided that the use of an
unlawfully obtained confession by the grand jury was a significant
abuse, use of the court's inherent oversight power would have been
fully justified.
In three other cases, however, the court of appeals allowed the defendant to raise issues which could create long delays in the prosecutorial process. In State v. Saiz,' 2 1 the court of appeals ruled that the
prosecutor acted properly in explaining to the grand jury why a certain matter was referred back to it. Although the result in Saiz is correct, the court's decision creates the possibility of lengthy delays in
the future if the prosecutor's comments to the grand jury become a
matter of judicial concern, particularly at the pre-trial stage. In Saiz
the appeal was not heard until after trial because the trial court had
denied the defendant's motion; but one can foresee trial courts
weighing relatively complex facts involving the propriety of the prosecutor's remarks, quashing the indictment, and being reversed on appeal, thereby greatly delaying trial. Given this risk of delay and the
absence of any due process interests of the defendant, the court
should exercise its overseeing power only in those circumstances
118. 93 N.M. 434, 601 P.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1979).
119. Id. at 435-36, 601 P.2d at 68-69.
120. It is noteworthy that the United States Supreme Court in its opinion in United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 352 n. 8 (1974), did not disavow the result in Silverthrone
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), which quashed a grand jury subpoena
for records that a court had previously ordered returned to the defendnat because they had
been seized unlawfully. One factor upon which Calandra distinguished Silverthrone was that
there had been a prior judicial determination of illegality of the seizure in the latter case.
121. 92 N.M. 776, 595 P.2d 414 (Ct. App. 1979).

Winter 1980-81)

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

where intentional, grossly improper remarks constitute a substantial
factor in the grand jury's decision to indict. In lesser cases, remedies
other than quashing an indictment would suffice.
Two other cases, State v. Herrera'2' 2 and State v. Harge, 23 involved the court's review of the prosecutor's failure to present certain
"exculpatory" evidence to the grand jury. In Herrera the court of
appeals upheld the dismissal of an indictment because the prosecutor
had not presented exculpatory evidence within his knowledge to the
grand jury. In Harge the court of appeals reversed the trial court for
dismissing an indictment on the ground that the prosecutor neither
complied with a grand jury request to produce a witness nor notified
the defense of the request. The court held that the prosecutor had
not refused a request or withheld exculpatory evidence and said that
the law does not "require that a defendant be allowed to present his
case. Instead, [it] only require[s] the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence if he has ' knowledge
of it and to withhold it would deny
1
defendant a fair trial. " 24
Although Herrera and Harge were decided on due process
grounds, ' 2 that approach contradicts the language in the Maldonado. 26 opinion (which postdated Herrera and Harge) that a due
process claim arising from grand jury proceedings must be founded
on a claim of denial of a fair trial. Not only is it unclear how the misconduct alleged in Herrera and Harge could lead to an unfair trial,
but Herrera and Harge were decided before the trial itself, making a
determination of its fairness difficult indeed. In both Herrera and
Harge the defendants had learned before trial that evidence was withheld from the grand jury, so that the evidence could not be termed
"withheld... at trial,"1 2 1 an express requirement of the Maldonado
test for determining when withholding exculpatory evidence violates
due process.
What, then, if the court in Herrera and Harge had considered exercising its power of oversight over the grand jury? The problem with
122. 93 N.M. 442, 601 P.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1979).
123. 94 N.M. 11,606 P.2d 1105 (Ct. App. 1979).
124. Id. at-,
606 P.2dat 1108.
125. A New Mexico statute states that "when [the grand jury] has reason to believe that
other competent evidence is available that may explain away or disprove a charge or accusation or that would make an indictment unjustified, then, it should order the evidence produced," N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-11(B) (Supp. 1980); but the Harge court held, following
Chance, that the statutory language is merely directory. Since the language appears in the
same statutory section as does the language held to be directory in Chance and its progeny,
the holding of the court of appeals is proper as a matter of statutory interpretation.
126. 93 N.M. 670, 672, 604 P.2d 363, 365 (1979).
127. Id. (emphasis in the original).
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reviewing whether exculpatory evidence has been presented to the
grand jury is illustrated by Harge, in which a lengthy delay resulted
from consideration of the issue. Perhaps in Herrerajustice was done,
but the defendant probably could have cleared his name more
quickly through acquittal at trial (presumably the outcome if the exculpatory evidence withheld was so significant) than by taking the
appellate route. The chief virtue of judicial review of issues such as
the withholding of exculpatory evidence from the grand jury is the
deterrence of future misconduct. Remedies such as disciplinary proceedings may be more effective and less disruptive to the judicial process than dismissal of the indictment in most cases of alleged improper presentation of evidence to the grand jury. Only the most
egregious conduct, such as intentionally using perjured testimony' 2 8
or withholding a confession by a third party, should justify quashing
an indictment.' 29
B. Other Matters Relating to the GrandJury.
Three other cases did not directly involve review of the propriety
of grand jury action, but raised some of the same issues discussed
above and may have implications for grand jury proceedings.
In State v. Chavez, ' 0 the grand jury had issued a no-bill, but the
district attorney proceeded by information. After a preliminary hearing, the trial court dismissed the information on the ground that all
the evidence presented by the district attorney at the hearing had
been in his possession at the time of the grand jury investigation. The
court of appeals, finding no constitutional, common law, or statutory
authority preventing the district attorney from filing an information
in these circumstances, ruled that the trial could proceed if the district court found probable cause at the preliminary hearing.
The Chavez opinion is of particular interest because of a statute
passed in 1979 which states that "[a] fter a grand jury acts on the
merits of evidence presented to it and returns a no-bill, the same matter shall not be presented again to that jury or another grand jury on
The statute will have little impact on the
the same evidence."'"
criminal justice system if the district attorney can circumvent it
merely by filing an information. The most important issue to be decided is whether the courts have authority to enforce the statute; if
128. State v. Reese, 91 N.M. 76, 570 P.2d 614 (Ct. App. 1977) (decided on due process
grounds).
129. This is apparently the standard in HawaiL State v. Bell, 60 Hawaii 241, 589 P.2d
517 (1978).
130. 93 N.M. 270, 599 P.2d 1067 (Ct. App. 1979).
131. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-11.1 (Supp. 1980).
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they do, frequent litigation may result.' 32 Chance and Maldonado
suggest that the statute is merely directory. If the legislature wanted
the matter to be reviewable in court, presumably it would have said
so explicitly, given its assumed knowledge of the rulings of Chance
and its progeny. In addition, the policy against delaying the prosecution is particularly strong with respect to judicial review of this issue,
because it may be difficult to determine what constitutes "the same
matter" or "the same evidence." Moreover, once the court is presented with an indictment by the second grand jury, what substantial
interest is served by quashing an indictment if there is no defect in
the second grand jury proceeding? Absent an intent to harass, the indictment itself would not seem unfair.
In re Investigation No. 2 of the Governor's Organized Crime Prevention Commission,'
involved a witness who failed to appear in
response to a subpoena duces tecum from the Commission. After a
hearing, the district court issued an order enforcing the subpoena.
When the witness appeared before the Commission, he refused to
turn over subpoenaed records on the ground that they were protected
under the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In
seeking a contempt order against the witness, the Commission argued
that the witness had waived the privilege by not raising it at the district court proceeding. The district court found the witness to be in
contempt, but the supreme court reversed. Although certain facts regarding waiver peculiar to the case apparently influenced the court's
decision, the precedential value of the ruling lies in its treatment of
when a fifth amendment claim regarding documents should be raised.
The court, without doing so explicitly, appeared to adopt the arguments of the Civil Liberties Union's Amicus Brief, which it summarized in its opinion:
[T] he evaluation of a claim of privilege before the witness appears
under oath and refuses to answer a specific question is inefficient
and awkward because the district court is not familiar with the subject matter and the scope of the Commission's inquiry; ... the court
cannot intelligently assess the validity of the witness' claim of privilege because it cannot compare a specific question or demand with
a specific, allegedly incriminatory answer or document.
134
This argument would have more force if the issue of whether a document is privileged under the fifth amendment ordinarily involved de132. One may wonder, however, about the likelihood of a district attorney presenting
identical evidence to a second grand jury.
133. 93 N.M. 525, 602 P.2d 622 (1979). The author assisted in the preparation of the
Commission's brief.
134. Id. at 526-27, 602 P.2d at 623-24.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11

termining whether the document was itself incriminatory. Generally,
however, the issue is whether the document is of a type for which the
individual can claim a privilege.' 35 More importantly, there is no requirement that the witness be asked any questions, except perhaps
those relating to authentication, at the proceeding at which the subpoenaed records are to be produced. Thus, inefficiency is likely to lie
not in asking the district court to make a judgment without a complete record, but in allowing delay of the resolution of the fifth
amendment question until the witness' second appearance before the
court.' I6 If applied to grand juries, this decision could prove harmful. Because grand juries have very short lifetimes-six months in New
Mexico' ' '-any delays in obtaining records can create serious difficulties. Perhaps, however, In re Investigation No. 2 has a more limited
scope. It may allow a claim of privilege with respect to documents to
be raised after court-ordered enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum
only when the witness had good reason not to raise the privilege at
the court hearing. The court said that the witness in this case could
not have known of the incriminatory aspects of certain documents
until he heard specific questions which were asked at the Commission
hearing. If the decision is so limited, investigators can avoid its result
by demanding production of all subpoenaed records before asking
specific questions, which is the better, customary procedure in any
event.
The issue in State v. Davis1 38 was whether a defendant prosecuted
by information was entitled to obtain a defense witness' testimony
given before a grand jury that had not investigated the case brought
against the defendant. The court ruled that "[ul nless the witness testified before the grand jury about the matter being tried, defendant
is not entitled to the grand jury transcript." 1 3 1 The court's ruling is
consistent with the reasons for grand jury secrecy. When the grand
jury testimony relates to a matter other than the one for which the
defendant is on trial, there is a substantial possibility that harm will
result from release of the testimony because it relates either to an ongoing investigation, which could be prejudiced by premature disclo135. For example, corporate and partnership records are not privileged under the selfincrimination clause of the fifth amendment. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
136. For example, in the In re Investigation No. 2 case, the Commission, after having
already obtained a court order at an adversary proceeding requiring the witness to turn over
the documents, would have to go back to court a second time, after the witness had appeared
before the Commission. The Commission ultimately could obtain any records to which it
was entitled, but the delay could be substantial and harmful to the investigation.
137. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-1 (1978).
138. 92 N.M. 563, 591 P.2d 1160 (Ct. App. 1979).
139. Id. at 574, 591 P.2d at 1171.
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sure, or to scandalous matters that were not found worthy of indictment by the grand jury. In addition, such testimony probably would
be useful only for collateral impeachment of a witness, which is generally improper cross-examination. The slight possibility of advantage
to the defendant cannot outweigh the legitimate reasons for grand
jury secrecy.
IV. SENTENCING
A. Sentencing Alternatives.
Three decisions dealt with the sentencing alternatives available to
the trial court. In State v. Aragon, 1 40 the defendant appealed the revocation of his probation. The district court had deferred a threeyear sentence, placed him on probation and imposed a $2,000 fine.
The court of appeals reversed the revocation because the trial court
cannot both defer a sentence and impose a fine, which is in itself a
sentence. Once the defendant paid the fine, his sentence was executed
and the deferral of the prison sentence became void, thereby ending
the probationary period before he was charged with violating the
terms of probation. Because imposition of a fine and suspension of a
sentence of imprisonment may be a useful sentencing tool, this decision deserves the attention of the legislature.
In State v. Pendley,"' the defendant had been sentenced under
the firearm enhancement statute, 142 which increases the minimum
and maximum terms of imprisonment for a felony by five years if a
firearm is used in the commission of the felony. The statute forbids
suspending the first year of a first offender's sentence. The trial court
decided that it also had no authority to defer imposition of the sentence, 1 43 but the court of appeals reversed. Although deferral of
sentencing appears to undercut the statute's purpose, the court of
appeals relied on the fact that the statute specifically prohibited both
deferral and suspension for second offenders while prohibiting only
suspension for first offenders. Thus, the failure to prohibit deferral
140. 93 N.M. 132, 597 P.2d 317 (Ct. App. 1979).
141. 92 N.M. 658, 593 P.2d 755 (Ct. App. 1979).
142. N.M. Stat Ann. § 31-18-4 (1978) (current version at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-16
(Supp. 1980)).
143. The chief differences between deferring imposition of sentence and suspending a
sentence that is imposed are: (1) once the period of deferral expires without revocation by
the court, the charges are dismissed, whereas one who successfully completes the period during which the sentence is suspended still has a criminal conviction on his or her record; and
(2) if the deferral is revoked, the judge can impose any sentence permissible under the applicable statute, but if suspension of a sentence is revoked, the court can impose no greater
penalty than the sentence whose imposition was suspended. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 31-20-1 to
-12 (1978).
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for first offenders would appear to have been intentional. This seems
to be an appropriate construction of the statute, but the legislative
intent is difficult to fathom. " 44

In State v. Nolan, 1,4 the trial court imposed consecutive sentences
for armed robbery, burglary, and contempt, and added a probationary period of three years to run after service of the three consecutive
sentences.146 The court of appeals voided the probationary part 4of7
defendant's sentence because the statutory authority for probation
does not provide for probation unless a sentence is suspended or deferred.
B. ProbationRevocation.
The two most striking decisions regarding sentencing concerned revocation of probation. In State v. Chavez, 148 the probation revocation hearing was conducted seven months after the defendant's arrest
on a charge of violating the terms of his probation. The revocation
was overturned on appeal on the ground that the seven-month delay
after his arrest was unreasonable, even though the defendant had been
in custody for only the first ten days. The court suggested that due
process required this result, but it focused on the statutory language,
which says that, after a probationer is arrested," [t]he court shall then
49
hold a hearing, which may be informal, on the violation charged."'
The court of appeals interpreted "then" to mean "promptly or
within a reasonably short period of time after an alleged violation or
after an arrest for a violation."' ' 0 This ruling creates the odd result
of imposing a more stringent test for "speedy revocation" of the probation of a non-incarcerated defendant than for "speedy trial."' ' , A
more flexible approach, defining "then" as "the next step" rather
than as "immediately," would have been helpful and would not have
distorted the statutory language. The court's rigid logic forced a result that may often be contrary to a probationer's own interest. In
the future, the State will need to seek a hearing immediately after
144. In the 1977 legislature, section 31-18-4 was repealed. The current law, N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 31-18-16 (Supp. 1980), prohibits suspension and deferral.
145. 93 N.M. 472, 601 P.2d 442 (Ct. App. 1979).
146. The sentence would have a similar effect to that of the special parole term imposed
under federal law in drug offenses. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (Supp. III 1979).
147. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20-5 (1978).
148. 94 N.M. 102, 607 P.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1979).
149. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-15(B) (1978) (emphasis added).
150. 94 N.M. at
, 607 P.2d at 643.
151. To determine whether there has been denial of a speedy trial, the court must weigh
(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of the
right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); State v.
Tafoya, 91 N.M. 121, 570 P.2d 1148 (Ct. App. 1977).
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the arrest rather than delaying the hearing to give the defendant time
to straighten himself out.' ' 2
State v. Montoya' ' ' held that a probationer is entitled to an opportunity to explain an alleged violation of probation, even if he admits the violation or was convicted in a criminal trial of committing
offenses on which the allegation of violation of probation is based.
After the defendnat admitted to the court in his "hearing" that he
had consumed alcohol in violation of his probation requirements, the
trial court ruled that there was no need to hear anything further and
revoked the probation. But the court of appeals, relying on United
States Supreme Court precedent, 1 54 held that the defendant has a
right to explain his violation and any mitigating circumstances. The
court also held that a new hearing would be required even though,
subsequent to the original "hearing," the defendant had been convicted of two criminal offenses alleged in the original motion to revoke probation. The court of appeals refused to presume that the
trial court would revoke probation based on the convictions. The
ruling may require a futile gesture, but holding a hearing would not
impose a great burden.
C. HearingRequired at Sentencing.
State v. Vialpando' ' ' upheld the action of the trial court in conducting a sentencing hearing immediately after trial without requiring
a presentence report. The judge had an unusual amount of information about the defendant. Not only had he read expert reports on the
defendant's competency to stand trial, but also he had previously
sentenced the defendant, with the assistance of a presentence report,
on another charge for which he was still serving time. Nevertheless,
the court of appeals' opinion is less than convincing. With respect to
the defendant's claim that "it was unfair to defendant to expect his
counsel to proceed immediately after 'a lengthy trial' to present to
the court an argument or evidence concerning sentencing, and to
deny defendant the hearing before sentencing that he automatically
is afforded when a presentence report is ordered,"' 5 6 the court of
appeals stated only that the argument was "patently vacuous."' 5
152.
-N.M.
153.
154.
(1972).
155.
156.
157.

But see State v. Sanchez, 94 N.M. -,
612 P.2d 1332 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
-_, 615 P.2d 992 (1980) (reaching a result contrary to Chavez).
93 N.M. 84, 596 P.2d 527 (Ct. App. 1979).
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488
93 N.M. 289, 599 P.2d 1086 (Ct. App. 1979).
Id. at 300, 599 P.2d at 1097.
Id.
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The court's reasoning is unclear. One would think that any defense
counsel would want an opportunity to collect his thoughts, evidence,
and arguments over a period of time before arguing sentencing before
the court. Also, there is some merit in the defendant's argument that
his conduct during fourteen months of incarceration subsequent to
commission of the offense might be relevant to sentencing. What is
most questionable, however, is the court of appeal's statement that
"the trial court recited cogent, compelling reasons for declining to
seek a presentence investigation before entering sentencing against
the defendant." ' I I Although the trial judge explained why he felt
sufficiently informed about the defendant to proceed to sentencing
immediately, he gave no "cogent" or "compelling" reason why the
sentencing proceeding could not be deferred. Public protection was
not an issue because the defendant was already incarcerated, and updating the prior presentence report would not have unduly burdened
the state's probation officers.
D. HabitualOffenders.
Three decisions involved New Mexico habitual offender statutes.
State v. Garduno' ' 9 dealt with enhanced punishment for second offenders of the Controlled Substances Act.' 60 The Act, which makes
it unlawful for any person "to intentionally traffic," 1 61 provides a
sentence of up to life imprisonment "for the second and subsequent
offenses. ' 6 2 Garduno had a prior federal drug conviction, but he
contended that a federal offense could not be used to increase the
penalty for his state conviction. The supreme court, noting that the
enhancement provision did not specifically require that the prior
offense have been prosecuted under the state statute, ruled that Garduno could be sentenced as a second offender since the elements of
the federal statute under which he had been convicted were identical
to those of the state trafficking statute.
State v. Rogers' 63 and State v. Valenzuela 64 both held that if a
defendant is charged as a second, third, or fourth offender under the
Habitual Offender Statute,' 6 5 each felony in the sequence must
have been committed after the defendant was convicted for the prior
158. Id. at 301, 599 P.2d at 1098.
159. 93 N.M. 335, 600 P.2d 281 (1979).
160. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 30-31-1 to -40 (Repl. 1980).
161. Id. § 30-31-20(B).
162. Id. § 30-31-20(B)(2).
163. 93 N.M. 519, 602 P.2d 616 (1979).
164. 94 N.M. 285, 609 P.2d 1241 (Ct. App. 1979).
165. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-5 (1978) (current version at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-17
(Supp. 1980)).
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offense. This resolution of the issue was not new, since the same interpretation was given to the statute in State v. Linam. 16 6
V. SEARCH AND SEIZURE

The lawfulness of a search or seizure is often the dispositive issue
in a criminal case. The importance of this issue is reflected in the
number of appeals last year in which it was raised.
A. The Warrant Requirement.
In general, a search is lawful only if a court has issued a search
warrant founded on probable cause.' 6 7 The exceptions to this re-

quirement, however, are a matter of continuing litigation.
1. Search of "Containers."
One "container" that has raised continual controversy in the law
of search and seizure is the automobile. It is well established that of-

ficers having probable cause to search an automobile that they have
stopped may search the vehicle without first obtaining a warrant. 1

6

8

The warrant requirement is waived because of the exigent circumstance that an automobile is highly mobile and therefore could dis-

appear while the officers seek a warrant.'

69

A warrant also is not re-

quired if the officers delay the search until after they have taken the
passengers into custody and impounded the vehicle.' 70
The automobile exception, however, does not justify warrantless
searches of automobiles in all circumstances. In State v. Luna,'
the New Mexico Supreme Court denied the validity of a warrantless
search of an impounded vehicle because the officers had not had
probable cause to search the car for evidence of murder and burglary
when it was stopped. They did not obtain such probable cause until
the car had been impounded, and by that time no "exigent circum-

stances" justified a warrantless search.'

72

166. 93 N.M. 307, 600 P.2d 253, cert. denied, 420 U.S. 250(1979).
167. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
168. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
169. In recent years the United States Supreme Court also has justified the automobile
exception on the basis that one does not expect as much privacy in an automobile as in a
home. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979).
170. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
171. 93 N.M. 773, 606 P.2d 183 (1980).
172. At the time that the car was stopped, the officers had probable cause to search the
car for evidence of three other offenses, including possession of marijuana. Therefore, under
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), a stationhouse search for such evidence would
have been unlawful But the Luna court rejected the argument that the search actually conducted was valid, apparently on the inexplicable ground that the scope of the actual search
would be different from the scope of the allowable search. Ordinarily, an officer's conduct
is not unlawful simply because his subjective justification for his conduct was incorrect.
State v. Luna, 93 N.M. 773, 606 P.2d 183 (1980) (officer gave wrong ground for arrest).
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Warrants also may be required before certain contents of an automobile may be searched. In State v. Walker,'I I the court of appeals
followed Arkansas v. Sanders,"" 4 recently decided by the United
States Supreme Court, and held that a suitcase seized from an automobile by the police could not be searched without a warrant. In
Sanders the United States Supreme Court held that once law enforcement officers seize an item such as a suitcase, whether from an automobile or elsewhere, there is no reason to conduct an immediate
search rather than to maintain the item in their custody until a warrant can be obtained.
On the other hand, in State v. Smith, 171 the court of appeals held
that no warrant was required to search a plastic bag "commonly used
to wrap or contain drug packets,"' 1 76 which was seized from an automobile. Relying on language in Sanders' 7 7 that a lawfully seized
container may be searched without a warrant if the contents can be
inferred from the outward appearance of the container, the court of
appeals rather questionably stated that in drug cases a plastic bag is
such a container. The record in Smith may establish that the nature
of the bag indicated its contents, but the opinion does not discuss
the facts in sufficient detail to justify that conclusion.' 78
A car's trunk appears to be sufficiently analogous to luggage that
it, too, would not be subiect to search without a warrant. But in State
v. Sandoval' 79 the court upheld a trunk search at an immigration
checkpoint by border patrol agents who smelled marijuana. In applying the automobile exception, the court of appeals did not distinguish
the trunk from the rest of the car. The decision predated Sanders,
but was not contradicted by it. The Supreme Court in Sanders stated
that generally all "integral parts" of the automobile (specifically including the trunk and glove compartment) may be searched without a
warrant.' 80 The Court suggested that the distinction between an integral part and removable luggage is based on the difficulty of securely impounding the vehicle.' "' The whole vehicle would need to
173. 93 N.M. 769, 605 P.2d 1168 (Ct. App. 1980).
174. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
175. 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 37, 38 (Ct. App. Jan. 17, 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 94
N.M. 379, 610 P.2d 1208 (1980).
176. 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 38.
177. 442 U.S. at 764-65.
178. A more recent New Mexico appellate case on searching packages is State v. White,
__N.M.
-, 615 P.2d 1004 (Ct. App. 1980) (boxes and bag could not be searched without a warrant).
179. 92 N.M. 476, 590 P.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1979).
180. 442 U.S. at 763.
181. Id. at 765-66, n. 14 (the same basis for the distinction was noted in United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 n. 7 (1977)).
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be impounded while a warrant was obtained to search an integral part
of it, which is not the case with an item of luggage.
Cases involving non-automobile searches also reflect the requirement that a container cannot be searched without a warrant absent
exigent circumstances. State v. Manus 82 held that a clothing pocket
is entitled to the protection of the warrant requirement. The defendant had been taken to a hospital emergency room for treatment
after a shooting incident in which he killed a police officer. His clothing was taken by hospital staff. A police officer asked for the clothing
as possible evidence and another officer, noting a weight in the pants,
looked through the pants and found four shotgun shells. The New
Mexico Supreme Court ruled that no exigent circumstances justified
proceeding without a warrant, because the clothing was in the exclusive control of the officers when the search was conducted.
In State v. Moore,' 83 however, the court of appeals found exigent
circumstances permitting a warrantless intrusion. While searching a
home for a burglary suspect, a police officer saw what looked like a
gun butt protruding from a mattress. When he lifted the mattress, he
found three rifle cases. The defendant argued on appeal that the officer could not open the closed cases without a warrant. The court of
appeals upheld the search as a proper exercise of protective action by
the officer. The victim of the burglary had told the officer that some
rifles were missing. The court reasoned that the officer was examining
the rifles to determine whether he had custody of the stolen rifles so
he could be sure none were available to be used by the defendant
against the officers.' 84
2. Search Incident to Arrest.
Although no exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search
of the defendant's clothing in State v. Manus,'8 5 the search might be
upheld as a "search incident to arrest." Law enforcement officers
may search without a warrant "for weapons, instruments of escape,
and evidence of crime when a person is taken into official custody
and lawfully detained."' 86 Such warrantless searches are not un182. 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280 (1979).
183. 92 N.M. 663, 593 P.2d 760 (CL App. 1979).
184. The court might also have noted that the contents of the gun cases were inferrable
from the shape of the container. Arkansas v. Sanders, decided after Moore, specifically cited
a gun case as an example of a container for which there can be no reasonable expectation of
privacy because its contents are inferrable from its outward appearance. 442 U.S. at 764-65,
nl 13.
185. 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280 (1979).
186. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03 (1974).
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limited in scope.1 8 7 But the Manus decision may have been too restrictive in rejecting the contention that the search could be upheld
as incident to an arrest. Manus relied on the general rule prohibiting
the search of an arrestee's personal effects if the items are in the exclusive control of officers.1 88 The court failed to note, however,
that the rule does not apply to personal effects which are "immediately associated with the person of the arrestee." ' 8 ' For example,
United States v. Edwards1 90 upheld a warrantless seizure of an
arrestee's clothing the morning after the arrestee was incarcerated.
Since in Manus the clothing was property "immediately associated"
with the arrestee's person, the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine was
not inapplicable simply because the item was in the exclusive control
of the law enforcement agents. Although there may be other reasons
why the search-incident-to-arrest exception would not apply to the
Manus facts,1 9 1 the court's reasoning does not adequately distinguish
Edwards.
In another search-incident-to-arrest decision, the court also apparently imposed requirements not established by the United States Supreme Court. In State v. Luna, ' '2 the defendant had been arrested
for a traffic offense. After he was taken into custody, he was recognized and questioned about a murder:
The police at that time seized the tennis shoes defendant was wearing, which appeared to match the footprint found next to the Taylor
purse. It is claimed that the warrantless seizure of the shoes was unreasonable. We disagree. It was reasonable for the officers to believe
187. For example, a search incident to an arrest cannot extend throughout the residence
where the arrestee is apprehended, but is limited to the area within his immediate control
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
188. The court, quoting Rodriguez v. State, 91 N.M. 700, 705, 580 P.2d 126, 131
(1978), said: "Where officers have within their exclusive control personal effects belonging
to the arrestee, a warrantless search of these items is illegal." 93 N.M. at 104, 597 P.2d at
280.
189. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977). The full quotation reads:
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal
property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to
their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee
might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence,
search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.
(Court's emphasis deleted, author's emphasis added.) By analogy with Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970), the arrestee's clothing can be searched without a warrant at the moment
of arrest, so there should be no objection to a later warrantless search of the same items.
Rodriguez v. State, 91 N.M. 700, 580 P.2d 126 (1978), involved a sleeping bag, so the personal effects exception to the general prohibition did not apply.
190. 415 U.S. 800(1974).
191. The circumstances of Manus' hospitalization and of the removal of his clothing are
not detailed in the opinion.
192. 93 N.M. 773, 606 P.2d 183 (1980).
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that the shoes were possible evidence of a crime, because the defendant had been implicated in other burglaries, and the police already
knew of the1 footprint found near the Taylor purse. The intrusion
was justified. 93
The court apparently upheld the seizure as one incident to an arrest,
but it appeared to require that a search and seizure in such circumstances also satisfy some sort of "reasonableness" test based on
grounds to believe that the items seized were possible evidence. The
United States Supreme Court, however, has not imposed such a requirement. ' 94
The Manus and Luna opinions may arise from a decision of the
New Mexico Supreme Court to impose a more stringent test on
searches incident to arrest than has the United States Supreme Court.
Although a state supreme court must follow the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court when interpreting the fourth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution, the New Mexico Constitution has its own search and seizure provision.' 9s The
New Mexico Supreme Court, therefore, may interpret the state's Constitution as prohibiting searches that are otherwise permissible under
the United States Constitution. The New Mexico courts in the past,
however, consistently have followed the constitutional rulings of the
United States Supreme Court on search and seizure issues. It is significant that the rulings in Manus and Luna say nothing about the
court's adopting a standard different from that of the United States
Supreme Court. In fact, both decisions rely on United States Supreme
Court authority on the search and seizure issue. The problem is that
other such authority was not considered.
3. "Plain View."
Three of the year's cases dealt with the "plain view" doctrine
which, with certain exceptions discussed below, permits an officer to
seize items in plain view if he has a right to be in the position from
which he obtains the view. A typical application of the doctrine is
193. Id. at 778, 606 P.2d at 188.
194. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), where the Court upheld an
officer's search of a cigarette pack in the pocket of an individual arrested for driving without
a license.
195. N.M. Const. art. 2, § 10 states:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or
seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be
searched, or the persons or things to be seized nor without a written showing of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11

State v. Doe. 1 9 6 A police officer followed a juvenile into his drive-

way after observing him speeding in a residential area. The juvenile
left his car without closing the door. While the officer, standing two
feet from the automobile, was checking to see if the youth had a
driver's license, he saw some marijuana cigarettes on top of the car's
console. The court ruled that the evidence was lawfully seized because it was in plain view.
Despite the apparent simplicity of the doctrine, its application may
be difficult and surprising. In State v. Turkal,' 9'7 officers were conducting a search pursuant to a warrant for marijuana and nude photographs. They came upon some tape recordings which they also seized.
Evidence at the scene (for example, a tape recorder and microphone
were hooked up under defendant's bed) suggested that the recordings
may have been evidence of a crime, but the supreme court ruled that
the seizure of the tape decks was unlawful because the warrant authorized the seizure only of items particularly described in it. Although
the officers were lawfully executing their task when they came upon
the tapes, the court in Turkal did not apply the plain view doctrine
because the contents of the tapes were not in plain view. Under Turkal, a plain view seizure is justified only if the incriminating nature of
the object is "immediately apparent" (as with a sawed off shotgun,
for example). If the object must be examined ("searched") further to
determine its incriminating nature, then it is not considered to be in
plain view. 1 9 8

State v. Luna' 9 9 presented a tantalizing set of facts as far as the
plain view doctrine is concerned. An officer conducting a lawful warrantless search of an automobile observed two stereo speakers, but
had no idea of their significance. Because the speakers' incriminating
nature was not immediately apparent, no seizure would have been
permitted at that time. The warrantless seizure of the speakers, conducted after the officers learned that the speakers were stolen was
held unlawful because the view of the speakers on the second search
was planned. Luna, following the plurality opinion in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire,2"' said the plain view doctrine requires that any
196. 93 N.M. 206, 598 P.2d 1166 (Ct. App. 1979).
197. 93 N.M. 248, 599 P.2d 1045 (1979).
198. Other courts have expressed this requirement, most notably the United States Supreme Court plurality in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See also United
States v. Berenguer, 562 F.2d 206, 210-11 (2nd Cir. 1977) (search of contents of wallet
illegal even though wallet was in plain view). Turkal's facts are very similar to those in the
seizure of pornographic films described in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 571 (1969), which was cited favorably by Coolidge v.
New Hampshireand expressly followed in Turkal.
199. 93 N.M. 773, 606 P.2d 183 (1980).
200. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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seizure under that exception to the warrant requirement be "inadvertent.",2 0 1 The rationale for this condition is that there is no justification for officers not to obtain a warrant for evidence they expect to
find.
4. Statutes.
Even when officers obtain a warrant satisfying all constitutional
requirements, the legislature may forbid the search. In State v.
Steele, 20 2 a valid sarch warrant was obtained to conduct a bloodalcohol test on the defendant. There was no constitutional issue. Section 66-8-111 of the New Mexico statutes, however, provides that
"[i] f a person under arrest refuses upon request of a law enforcement officer to submit to chemical tests designated by the law enforcement agency as provided in [the Act], none shall be administered." 2 o The court of appeals held that the search was invalid
because it was conducted without the consent of the defendant, and
the evidence obtained in the search was suppressed. Of course, the
result in such a case can be altered by legislative enactment.
The legislature also may "forbid" a specific procedure for seizing
evidence simply by failing to approve that procedure. In Sanchez v.
Attorney General,2 0 4 the attorney general obtained a court order requiring a suspect to provide handwriting exemplars. The suspect had
not been arrested or indicted, so no criminal case had been initiated
against him. The court of appeals found no constitutional prohibition
against the order, but it also found no authorization for it in state
law. Because the district courts do not have unlimited power, such a
procedure for issuing an order would be proper only if a statute specifically provided for it or the practice was "known to the common
Finding
0
law and equity practice of England prior to 1776 ....-2"
no historical precedent, the court of appeals ruled the order invalid.
Such an order could be obtained, however, once the suspect was
charged formally with the offense for which the exemplars were
sought; examplars also could be obtained through a grand jury subpoena. 2 0 6 The attorney general's investigation, therefore, need not
be stymied.
201. 93 N.M. at 779, 606 P.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1979).
202. 93 N.M. 470, 601 P.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1979).
203. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-111 (1978).
204. 93 N.M. 210, 598 P.2d 1170(Ct. App. 1979).
205. 93 N.M. at 214, 598 P.2d at 1174. Article 6, section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution provides that the district courts have "original jurisdiction." The language quoted is
the Sanchez court's description of those matters encompassed by original jurisdiction.
206. The opinion did not suggest why the attorney general had not proceeded via a
grand jury.
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B. Procedurefor Challenginga Search.
Two decisions during the year involved procedural requirements
for raising search and seizure issues. In State v. Doe,2 7 the court of
appeals allowed a juvenile to move to suppress evidence at trial despite
a children's court rule of procedure stating that all pre-adjudicatory
motions "shall be filed" within twenty days of the filing of the petition alleging delinquency. 2 0 8 The court held that the rule merely
provided an alternative means for a defendant to move to suppress
evidence, and that the objection to the evidence may be raised at
trial.2 09 The court indicated that requiring a motion to suppress to
be made within the pre-trial time limits would be a "finicky procedural requirement." 2" 0 The Doe court, however, did not consider
the potential disruptions resulting from hearing a motion during the
trial and the prejudice to the prosecution resulting from such a procedure. The prosecution can appeal from an adverse decision at a pretrial hearing of a motion to suppress, but if the evidence is not suppressed until trial, the prosecution may have no means to prevent an
2
unappealable acquittal. 11
State v. Cervantes2 1 2 involved a challenge to the veracity of a
search warrant affidavit. The court adopted the procedures set out by
the United States Supreme Court in Franks v. Delaware.2 ' ' Under

Franks, a hearing attacking the veracity of an affidavit is required
only if the defendant provides an offer of proof supporting allegations of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth by government agents. The defendant should furnish affidavits or other reliable statements to support his attack or explain satisfactorily why
they are unavailable. As a result of these requirements, hearings on
the veracity of affidavits will be uncommon in New Mexico courts.
C. ProbableCause.
In general, an arrest or search must be predicated on "probable
cause." Officers have "probable cause" to arrest when "the facts and
207. 93 N.M. 143, 597 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1979).
208. N.M. Child. Ct R. 14.
209. The result is inconsistent with State v. Vialpando, 93 N.M. 289, 293, 599 P.2d
1086, 1090 (1979), which said that a trial motion to suppress a line-up identification was
untimely because New Mexico Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(c) requires motions to suppress to be filed within twenty days of the entry of a plea.
210. 93 N.M. at 148, 597 P.2d at 1188.
211. The New Mexico statute allowing appeals by the state of suppression orders does
not explicitly bar an appeal during the trial. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-3-3(B)(2) (1978). The
federal statute, however, does bar such appeals. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976). Moreover, there
may be a constitutional problem with mid-trial review.
212. 92 N.M. 643, 593 P.2d 478 (Ct. App. 1979).
213. 438 U.S. 154(1978).
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circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent
man in believing that the [arresteel had committed or was committing an offense." 2 1 ' The test seems straightforward, but it can be
difficult to determine whether specific facts justify a finding of probable cause.
One area in which the United States Supreme Court has provided
guidance is in the use of informants to establish probable cause. The
Supreme Court has held that information obtained from an informant
may be used to establish probable cause when the officer's affidavit
establishes (1)the underlying observations from which the informant
could draw his or her conclusions, and (2) that the informant is reliable. 2 1 I New Mexico appellate courts considered the second requirement in two decisions during the year.
In State v. Cervantes,2 6 the sole fact establishing the informant's
credibility was that in the prior week he had given information resulting in the recovery of stolen property. It is probably impossible to
find a principle which could determine precisely where to draw the
line as to how much prior accurate information should be required to
establish the reliability of an informant. Significantly, the court drew
the line at the least possible amount: one prior piece of accurate information made the informant "reliable."
The court of appeals' approval of such use of informant information, however, may apply only in reviewing warrants and not in reviewing warrantless searches and seizures. Although the court of appeals before it had the same information concerning the informant's
reliability as did the judge issuing the warrant, the court emphasized
that it was only reviewing the decision of the issuing judge, that his
determination should be paid great deference, and that it could not
"say that the issuing judge's common-sense view ...was erroneous as
a matter of law." 2 I7 This ruling reflects the view of the United States
Supreme Court that warrants are to be encouraged and that in close
cases the fact that a warrant
was issued may tip the scales in favor of
2
finding probable cause. 1 8
An issue in State v. Turkal2 1 9 was the veracity of a young female
informant who stated that the defendant had furnished illegal drugs
214.
215.
(1964).
216.
217.
218.
219.

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
92 N.M. 643, 593 P.2d 478 (Ct. App. 1979).
Id. at 647, 593 P.2d at 482.
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
93 N.M. 248, 599 P.2d 1045 (1979).
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to juveniles and had taken nude pictures of young girls. The court
found that her veracity was established by the substantial corroboration in the affidavit of her allegation of drug distribution. The court
did not discuss an additional factor supporting the veracity of the informant. According to the affidavit, the informant was simply a
"concerned juvenile citizen." 2 20 Questions of credibility
that arise
when an informant is involved personally in the criminal activity,
therefore, did not arise.
Several other appellate decisions concerning the meaning of probable cause are so dependent on their facts that they have little precedential value. Language in two opinions should be mentioned, however. In State v. Moore,' 2 1 the defendant had rented a house located
approximately one block from his landlord. The landlord's house was
burglarized and a witness described to police officers a man he had
seen at the front door of the landlord's house early in the evening of
the burglary. The landlord told officers that the description met that
of the defendant and later pointed out the defendant to officers. The
issue before the court was whether officers had probable cause to arrest
the defendant for the burglary. The opinion stated that "there was
probable cause to arrest Moore for the burglary on the basis of the
two identifications that [the victim/landlord] made to [the police
officer] ."2 2 2 This abbreviated statement may be intended to encompass all the various facts of the case indicating the defendant's guilt
to the officers prior to the defendant's arrest. 2 2 3 But, standing alone
it suggests that there is probable cause to arrest someone for burglary
of his landlord's house simply because he is seen at the front door of
the house on the evening of the burglary. This language of Moore
could be misused to justify or encourage2 24 unlawful police action.
In Sanchez v. Attorney General,2 2 5 discussed earlier, the attorney
general, investigating false Medicaid claims from the drug store Sanchez owned, had obtained a court order compelling Sanchez to provide handwriting exemplars. The court of appeals found no authority
for the district court's order requiring the exemplars. In one section
of the opinion the court rejected the theory that the order was the
equivalent of a search warrant. After explicitly withholding a ruling
on whether the affidavit established probable cause, the court merely
220. Id. at 250, 599 P.2d at 1047.
221. 92 N.M. 663, 593 P.2d 760 (Ct App. 1979).
222. Id. at 666, 593 P.2d at 763.
223. The facts included various attempts by the defendant to conceal his identity and
evade police officers.
224. This might occur if the decision is used in training or advising law enforcement
officers.
225. 93 N.M. 210, 598 P.2d 1170 (Ct. App. 1979).
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said that the order and affidavit did not satisfy the requirements of
Rule of Criminal Procedure 17226 of the purposes of a search warrant authorized by the rule, the one applicable to the facts of the
case would be one authorizing searches for evidence which "would
be material evidence in a criminal prosecution." 2 27 The court said
that this purpose was not satisfied: "This comparison is desired because the investigator does not know whether Sanchez is involved in
the false claim. The affidavit contains nothing indicating Sanchez'
handwriting exemplars 'would' be in evidence." 2 2 8 Since the court
stated that it was not considering the issue of probable cause, the
result apparently would have been the same even if the affidavit had
established probable cause to believe that Sanchez participated in the
fraud and signed a document used to perpetrate it. The above language also would seem to prohibit issuing a search warrant for a suspect's shoe so that the police may compare it with footprints found
at the scene of the crime. Despite having probable cause to believe
that the shoe would fit the footprint, officers would not "know" it
and, therefore, would want the shoe for purposes of comparison.
Perhaps, however, the court is merely being technical in requiring
that an applicant for a warrant specifically state that there is probable cause to believe the item to be compared will be evidence. Such
a recitation would force the applicant and the issuing judge to focus
on the probable cause requirement that must be met before a warrant can issue. Without this focus, the requirements for a warrant
could be confused with the lesser standard for a subpoena. This lesser
standard permits acquisition of, for example, a handwriting exemplar
if the exemplar would merely be "relevant," even if there is no probable cause to believe the witness wrote the writing in question.2 29
VI. MISCELLANEOUS

A. Notice.
The notice required by due process was the key issue in three cases
decided during the year.
In In re Klecan, 30 the supreme court overturned a contempt citation against an attorney. The court held that summary punishment
for contempt for courtroom misconduct may not be imposed and enforced unless it is clear on the record that the contemnor was given a
226. N.M.R. Crim. P. 17(a).
227. Id.
228.
229.
sion, 91
230.

93 N.M. at 212, 598 P.2dat 1172.
In re Investigation No. 2 of the Governor's Organized Crime Prevention CommisN.M. 516, 577 P.2d 414 (1978).
93 N.M. 637, 603 P.2d 1094 (1979).
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specific warning by the judge, an opportunity to explain, and a hearing. Only in the case of "flagrant contemptuous conduct," 2 3 ' where,
for example, there is a violent disruption of the proceedings or blatant disrespect for the judge, can punishment be imposed without
those prerequisites.
In Roybal v. Martinez, 2 3 2 a contempt citation for violation of a
court order was overturned because the defendant had not been
served personally with the Order to Show Cause.2 3 3 The unusual aspect of the case was that the defendant appeared at the hearing on
the Order to Show Cause and two weeks earlier had filed an affidavit
in which he responded to the Order. The appellate court, however,
accepted the defendant's contention that service had not been consummated 2 34 and held that the defendant had not waived his objection concerning lack of service by making a special appearance at the
hearing for the purpose of raising that very objection.
In City of Albuquerque v. Juarez,2 3 the defendant was convicted
for driving while his driver's license was suspended. He claimed that
the prosecution failed to show that he had actual knowledge of the
suspension. The notice of suspension had been sent to the defendant
by certified mail but was returned to the sender unclaimed. The
court of appeals held that it was not necessary to prove that the
licensee had actual knowledge of the suspension, but reversed the
conviction, holding that the prosecution needed to show that either
the defendant had acknowledged2 3receipt of the notice or that he voluntarily had avoided receiving it. 6
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
The constitutional right of an accused to the assistance of coun231. Id. at 639, 603 P.2d at 1096.
232. 92 N.M. 630, 593 P.2d 71 (Ct. App. 1979).
233. Because a criminal contempt proceeding is independent of the proceeding in which
the order was issued, it must be initiated by personal service on the defendant. State v.
Armijo, 38 N.M. 280, 31 P.2d 703 (1934); Lindsey v. Martinez, 90 N.M. 737, 568 P.2d 263
(Ct. App. 1977).
234. The defendant testified that his affidavit was in response to newspaper articles
rather than to the court documents which were not served on him.
235. 93 N.M. 188, 598 P.2d 650(Ct. App. 1979).
236. The court said:
The City did not establish either of these notice attempts, nor was there
any evidence that the defendant had moved over ten days before the notice
was sent [N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-5-22 (1978) requires a licensee to notify
the Motor Vehicle Division within ten days of a change of address] or that
he refused to claim the letter. Lacking such proof, the prosecution must
show other good faith and accepted methods of notifying a driver that his
license has been suspended.
Id. at 191, 598 P.2d at 653.

Winter 1980-81]

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

sel. .. also requires that the assistance be effective. The claim of ineffective assistance, though regularly made, is rarely upheld. Typical
treatment of the issue is found in State v. Mills.2 3 I The court of appeals answered the defendant's claim summarily by stating: "His claim
basically goes to trial strategy which does not establish such a claim.
The record fully supports the trial court's ruling that defendant's representation was 'highly competent' in a case where the evidence 'was
overwhelming as to the guilt of this defendant.' "2 3 9
State v. Luna 2 4 0 was the only case providing some relief to the
defendant on such a claim. The court remanded the case to district
court to determine whether trial counsel's representation of defendant on a conspiracy charge had been effective. The charge had
named three co-conspirators. Before defendant's trial, one pled guilty
to other charges and the conspiracy charge against him was dropped.
The other two were acquitted of the conspiracy charge by a jury. The
dismissal and the two acquittals took place well before defendant's
trial. Apparently, the court of appeals believed that the defendant's
counsel had an obligation to take some steps predicated on the prior
acquittals and the dismissal: "Although defendant might properly
have been charged as combining with [the defendant against whom
the charge was dismissed], he was tried on the charge of a four-man
conspiracy. His trial counsel did nothing to attack or limit that
charge by motion or otherwise." 2 " The court of appeals, by citing
a case involving the doctrine of collateral estoppel,2 4 2 may have been
suggesting that the defendant could have benefitted under that doctrine from the acquittals of the alleged co-conspirators. But the
United States Supreme Court has recently, in a unanimous decision,
rejected the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel in criminal
cases (the estoppel being "nonmutual" because the defendant seeking
to raise the estoppel was not a party to the prior trial).2 43 Nevertheless, there is authority that one cannot be convicted of conspiracy if all alleged co-conspirators are acquitted,2 44 so Luna may
237. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
238. 94 N.M. 17, 606 P.2d 1111 (Ct App. 1980).
239. Id. at -,
606 P.2d at 1114. Other cases denying claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel were State v. Gutierrez, 93 N.M. 232, 599 P.2d 385 (Ct. App. 1979), and State v.
Urioste, 93 N.M. 504, 601 P.2d 737 (Ct App. 1979).
240. 92 N.M. 680, 594 P.2d 340 (Ct App. 1979).
241. Id. at 686, 594 P.2d at 346.
242. State v. Tijerina, 86 N.M. 31, 519 P.2d 127 (1973).
243. Standefer v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1999 (1980) (conviction of aiders and
abettors).
244. State v. Gilmore, 47 N.M. 59, 134 P.2d 541 (1943) (dictum); contra Gardner v.
State, 286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d 1317 (1979); People v. Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d 333, 428
N.Y.S.2d 927 (Ct. App. 1980); Development, Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920,
974 (1959).
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have had grounds for a pretrial motion modifying the indictment.2 4 5
The peculiarity of the Luna decision is that instead of addressing
the merits of the contention that the indictment was improper and
needed modification, the court remanded for a hearing on whether
the trial attorney's failure to raise the issue constituted ineffective
assistance of counsl. Yet, the trial court can hardly rule on whether
the assistance of original counsel was effective until it decides whether
modification of the indictment was proper. There is nothing "ineffective" in failing to raise an objection that will be overruled. The court
of appeals rightly could be concerned that the defendant, a minor
participant in the offense, was convicted of a conspiracy when the
three other alleged co-conspirators "got off." It strains the doctrine
of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, to require a hearing on
that issue when the court failed to point to specific instances
of defi2
cient conduct of trial counsel that could harm his client. 46
C. Confession Cases.
Three cases raised the issue of admissibility of confessions. State v.
Adams 2 4 ' apparently affirmed the rule that a confession is inadmissible if it is induced by an express or implied promise of leniency,
but the supreme court held that there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court's ruling that no such promise was made.
In State v. Poller, 48 the issue was whether a voluntary statement
was the fruit of a prior statement obtained in violation of the Miranda
rules. 2 4 9 The defendant approached the first officer to arrive at the
scene of a killing and told him that the victim had stolen money from
her and that she had shot him. Next, without being given any Miranda
warnings, she was taken into custody in an officer's patrol car and
questioned about the shooting. She repeated her first statement. She
was then placed in the vehicle of another officer, who did advise her
of her Miranda rights. Although she said that she did not wish to
waive her right to remain silent and did not wish to talk, she volunteered further information about the shooting. The court of appeals,
recognizing that the state had to prove that the third statement was
not the product of the unlawfully obtained second statement, ruled
that the state had met its burden.
245. The dismissal of the conspiracy charge against the fourth alleged co-conspirator
would not benefit Luna. State v. Verdugo, 79 N.M. 765, 449 P.2d 781 (1969).
246. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1719 (1980) (must show "an actual lapse
in representation," even when attorney had potential conflict of interest).
247. 92 N.M. 669, 593 P.2d 1072 (1979).
248. 93 N.M. 257, 599 P.2d 1054 (Ct. App. 1979).
249. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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State v. Day2 1° is the most interesting of the three cases involving
confessions, particularly in light of a subsequent United States Supreme Court decision. 2 5 ' The defendant, after being advised of his
Miranda rights and declining to sign a written waiver, remarked that
"[T]his is all hogwash." '2 1 2 The officer, believing the remark referred
to the advice of rights, asked the defendant what "hogwash" meant.
The defendant then gave an incriminatory statement concerning his
actions. The court gave two alternative grounds for finding the statement of the defendant admissible. First, it held that the defendant
had waived his right to remain silent because his answer came after
he was advised of his rights and was aware of them. This argument is
questionable since the defendant's refusal to sign a written waiver
strongly, if not explicitly, indicates that the defendant did not wish
to be interrogated. Under these circumstances, the officer should not
have interrogated the defendant. 2
The court's second reason for admitting the statement hits closer
to the mark. The court stated that the defendant's answer was not responsive to the question, was not the result of in-custody questioning, and was volunteered. Although the court may be faulted for its
failure to explain either the relevance of the defendant's unresponsiveness or its criteria for determining whether a statement was the
result of in-custody questioning or was volunteered, the decision appears to focus on the elements of the situation which were held critical in Rhode Island v. Innis,2 ' a United States Supreme Court case
decided two months later. In Innis the United States Supreme Court
held that "interrogation" refers to "any words or actions on the part
of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custoday) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminatory response from the suspect." 2 ' Under this standard
the officer was not "interrogating" Day when he asked the meaning
of "hogwash." Day's answer may have been responsive in his mind,
but it was not the type of answer the officer reasonably expected to
elicit, so there was no "in-custody interrogation." In Innis the officers
did not directly ask the defendant any questions, but the principle of
that case would seem to support the Day result.
617 P.2d 142 (1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3248 (Oct. 7,
250.
-. N.M. -,
1980).
251. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
252. Id. at - , 617 P.2d at 148.
253. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975) (once a person has invoked his
right to silence, interrogation cannot be resumed after only a "momentary respite").
254. 100 S.Ct. 1682 (1980).
255. Id. at 1689.
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D. Competency.
The two chief decisions on the issue of competency were procedural ones. In State v. Luna,2 s6 the court held that a defendant who
raises the issue of insanity is not entitled to a bifurcated trial. In a bifurcated trial, sanity is determined at a proceeding separate from the
proceeding in which it is decided whether the defendant committed
the alleged acts. The defendant argued that to establish insanity it
was necessary to introduce "evidence of prior acts and self-incriminating statements made to psychologists and psychiatrists, ' 2 7 and
that a limiting instruction could not prevent the jury from considering that evidence when deciding whether defendant committed the
alleged acts. The court held that due process did not require such a
bifurcation. It ruled that the issues should be decided in one proceeding until Rule 40 of the Rules for Criminal Procedure for the District
Courts, which establishes the order of trial, is altered. Although certain types of bifurcation procedures may raise due process problems,
those problems are surmountable" and the force of the defendant's
argument in Luna suggests that an amendment to the rule should be
considered. 2 s
The other procedural case was State v. Sena. 216 Sena held that
the issue of the defendant's competency to stand trial or to be sentenced can be raised at any time. The court ruled that the trial judge
should have conducted a hearing on those competency issues upon
the defendant's request following a post-trial diagnostic evaluation.
The State argued that a new trial was unjustified because evidence of
incompetence could have been discovered before trial by the exercise
of due diligence. 2 6 1 The court of appeals said that if the defendant
had been incompetent, he could hardly have waived his rights on the
issue.
Sena also held that the judge, without a jury, should conduct the
256. 93 N.M. 773, 606 P.2d 183 (1980).
257. Id. at 779, 606 P.2d at 189.
258. For example, it would be violative of due process to forbid psychiatric testimony
relevant to intent at the first proceeding and then forbid a decision on any issue but insanity
at the first proceeding and then forbid a decision on any issue but insanity at the second
stage. See State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P. 2d 715 (1970). The subtleties of the issues involved would require too long a discussion for this article. For a good discussion see Comment, Due Process and Bifurcated Trials: A Double-Edged Sword, 66 Nw. U.L. Rev. 327
(1971).
259. The Committee Commentary to Rule 40 does not indicate that it considered the
possibility of bifurcation when an insanity defense is raised.
260. 92 N.M. 676, 594 P.2d 336 (Ct. App. 1979).
261. The requirement sought by the state is imposed in the ordinary case of a motion
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. State v. Lucero, 90 N.M. 342, 344, 563
P.2d 605, 607 (Ct. App. 1977).

Winter 1980-81]

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

post-trial hearing on competency, at which the defendant has the
burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence. The chief
obstacle to this result was State v. Chavez, 62 which had held unconstitutional a New Mexico statute and rule of procedure requiring the
court, without a jury, to decide the issue of competency to stand
trial. Chavez was based on a state constitutional provision guarantee2 63
ing the right to a jury trial as it existed at the time of statehood
and on an 1855-56 statute, which was in effect until 1967 and provided for a jury trial of the competency issue.2 64 But Sena, trying to
reconcile Chavez with the supreme court's recently issued Rule of
Criminal Procedure 35(b), which provides for the judge to determine
competency in circumstances like those in Sena, noted the ambiguity
of the 1855-56 statute and distinguished earlier decisions as not involving post-trial motions. The court held that a jury trial is not constitutionally required on the issues of (1) competency to stand trial,
if the issue is not raised until the sentencing hearing, and (2) competency to be sentenced.
E. Venue.
Section 30-1-14 of the New Mexico statutes provides that the trial
of a crime can be held "in any county in which a material element of
the crime was committed." 2 6 ' Two appellate decisions during the
year considered the issue of where venue lies for certain offenses.
In State v. Smith, 2 66 the defendant was tried for murder in Bernalillo County even though the bodies of the victims were discovered
in Torrance County and the crime was allegedly committed in Torrance County. The court held, however, that there was substantial
evidence that the defendant formed the intent to kill in Bemalillo
County.
In State v. Marsh,2 6 7 the defendants were charged in Valencia
County with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute it and
conspiracy. The State alleged that one defendant flew a plane over
Valencia County to a location in McKinley County where the plane
landed to unload the marijuana. There was no evidence that the assistants on the ground had been in Valencia County or that the pilot
had landed in Valencia County.
On the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute,
the court of appeals held that venue existed in any county in which
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

88 N.M. 451, 541 P.2d 631 (Ct. App. 1975).
N.M. Const. art. 2, § 12.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-13-3 (1953) (repealed 1967).
Id. § 30-1-14 (1978).
92 N.M. 533, 591 P.2d 664 (1979).
19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 182 (Ct. App. Feb. 28, 1980).
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the pilot traveled with the marijuana because two elements of the
crime, possession and intent to distribute, existed in that county.
Furthermore, because an aider or abettor can be tried in any county
where the principal can be tried, those waiting on the ground in
McKinley County to help the pilot could also be tried in Valencia
County.
The court reached a different result on the conspiracy charge. It
said that venue was proper only in the county in which the conspiracy was entered into and, perhaps, where an overt act took place in
furtherance of the conspiracy. 6 8 There was no evidence to support
the first ground for venue. As for the second ground, the court, without deciding whether to follow the widely accepted rule that an overt
act can be the basis for venue, said that the only act alleged to have
occurred in Valencia County was flying over that county, which was
not an overt act in the county. Therefore, venue would not lie in Valencia County.
The second ruling in Marsh is questionable for two reasons. First,
why isn't flying over a county an overt act of the conspiracy? The
flight was the key element of the conspiracy. The case relied upon by
the court offers little support; rather, it relied on a case suggesting
that Marsh was decided incorrectly.2 69 Secondly, if, as Marsh held,
venue for the offense of possession with intent to distribute lay in
Valencia County because the pilot had the requisite intent while flying over the county, then venue should be proper for the conspiracy
2 0
charge. Intent to distribute is a material element of the conspiracy; 7
so the same intent that provides venue for the substantive crime
would also provide venue for the conspiracy charge. 2 71
268. Id. at 184.
269. The case cited by Marsh, United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974), held that landing a plane and making a phone call in the
judicial district were enough to establish venue, but it did not say that such acts were required. The case relied upon by Barnard ruled that driving through the district was sufficient
to establish venue for a conspiracy to smuggle drugs. United States v. Trenary, 473 F.2d 680
(9th Cir. 1973). On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed and held that the
transportation of marijuana through the county was an overt act; but it exercised its superintending power over inferior courts to require trial in McKinley County. Marsh v. State, 20
N.M. St. B. Bull. 13 (Dec. 5, 1980).
270. N.M.U.J.I. Crim. 28.20 gives as the second element of the offense of conspiracy:
"2. The defendant and the other person intended to commit [the felony which the defendant allegedly conspired to commit] ." In other words, a material element of the conspiracy
charge is that the defendant have the intent to commit the felony which is the object of the
conspiracy.
271. The conspiracy charged in Marsh was a conspiracy to distribute drugs, rather than a
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute. The court did not suggest that while the
pilot was flying over Valencia county he had no intent to commit the offense of distribution.
The court found that there was an allegation that the pilot had the requisite intent for possession with intent to distribute, and an element of that offense is that the defendant "intended to transfer" the controlled substance. N.M.U.J.I. Crirn. 36.03.
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F. Elements of Substantive Offenses.
Several decisions last year defined the elements of criminal offenses. Two dealt with forgery,2 72 two with fraud,2" ..' and one each
with embezzlement, 2 11 unlawful transfer of a motor vehicle, 2 s
criminal sexual penetration, 2 76 assault on a peace officer, 2 7 extor-

tion,2 8 and enhancement of a sentence for use of a firearm.2

9

272. In State v. Cook, 93 N.M. 91, 596 P.2d 860 (Ct. App. 1979), the defendant, using
a name he had assumed for several years, opened a checking account with a deposit of $50
and then wrote checks totaling more than $6,000 on the account. The court reversed the
conviction for forgery on the ground that forgery is not committed when "the check purports to be the very act of the person issuing it and not the act of another person." Id. at
92, 596 P.2d at 861. In State v. Saavedra, 93 N.M. 242, 599 P.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1979), the
court held that to commit the crime of forgery it is not necessary for the defendant actually
to have signed the forged signature on the check. The defendant need only "make up" the
check (such as by filling in the name of the payee) as long as he has the requisite knowledge
and intent.
273. In State v. Martinez, 18 N.M. St. B. Bull. 720 (Ct. App. 1979), the court held that
in determining the degree of a fraud the relevant amount is not the financial injury to the
victim, but the amount of money obtained by the defendant as a result of the fraud. Thus,
one is guilty of the offense of committing fraud in excess of $2,500 if the victim pays the
defendant $2,501, even though the victim's loss is significantly less because the value of the
property obtained from the defendant by the victim might be $2,000. In State v. Hamilton,
19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 185 (Ct. App. Feb. 28, 1980), the court reiterated the New Mexico rule
that reliance by the victim is an element of the offense of fraud. But it added that it is no
defense to the charge that the victim's reliance was negligent.
274. In State v. Stahl, 93 N.M. 62, 596 P.2d 275 (Ct. App. 1979), the court held that a
store clerk in charge of the store during the evening could not be convicted of embezzling
money from a drop-box at the store because he was not "entrusted" with the contents. He
had no keys to the drop-box and had no permission or authority to take any money out of
it. If he took money from the drop-box, he would have to be charged with larceny rather
than embezzlement.
275. The issue in State v. Montano, 93 N.M. 436, 601 P.2d 69 (Ct. App. 1979), was the
meaning of "pass title" in the statute making it unlawful to transfer possession of a vehicle
with intent to pass title when the person knows or has reason to know that the vehicle has
been stolen or unlawfully taken. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-3-505 (1978). The defendant argued
that because the vehicle was stolen he had no title to pass. The court of appeals, however,
held that the statute is violated if the defendant intended to pass whatever form of title he
had, and possession may constitute that form of title.
276. In State v. Urioste, 93 N.M. 504, 601 P.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1979), the court conconsidered the meaning of "aided or abetted" in the definition of the crime of sexual penetration in the second degree. The offense is committed when criminal sexual penetration is
perpetrated "by the use of force or coercion when the perpetrator is aided or abetted by
one or more persons." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-11 (1978). The defendant argued that aiding
and abetting were to be construed in their technical legal sense and that it was therefore necessary for the prosecution to prove the requisite criminal intent of the aiders and abettors.
But the court, citing the commentary to the Uniform Jury Instructions, held that the intent
of the aiders and abettors was not an element of the crime and it was sufficient to instruct
the jury that thedefendant "acted with the help or encouragement of one or more persons."
The court took a common sense approach and assumed that the drafters of the statute were
not using language in a legally sophisticated sense.
277. State v. Rhea, 93 N.M. 478, 601 P.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1979), held that assault on a
peace officer requires the peace officer to be performing his duties. Failure to instruct on
that element was reversible error, even in the absence of an objection at trial by defendant.
278. In State v. Barber, 93 N.M. 782, 606 P.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1979), the court held that
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the threat necessary for commission of the crime of extortion can be communicated through
acts as well as through words. The court found that defendant's prior attack on the victim
and his ranting and raving at the victim constituted sufficient communication of a threat.
279. In State v. Chouinard, 93 N.M. 634, 603 P.2d 744 (Ct. App. 1979), the court held
that the statute, which increases the sentence for the commission of a felony if the defendant "used" a firearm in the felony, does not encompass simple possession of the firearm
during the commission of the felony.

